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STATE RESPONSES TO THE SPECTER OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL 
PROCEEDINGS: THE KENTUCKY RACIAL 
JUSTICE ACT AND THE NEW JERSEY 
SUPREME COURT’S PROPORTIONALITY 
REVIEW PROJECT 
Alex Lesman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since April 22, 1987, when the United States Supreme Court 
handed down McCleskey v. Kemp,1 the death penalty in America 
has operated in a twilight of simultaneous acknowledgement and 
denial of racial discrimination in the ultimate punishment. In 
McCleskey, the Supreme Court admitted the existence of racial 
disparity in capital sentencing,2 but declined to recognize it as a 
constitutional violation.3 In the three decades since the Court 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2005; M.A., University of Virginia, 1996; 
B.A., Amherst College, 1995. The author thanks Laurel Edmundson for her 
steadfast support, George Kendall, Ursula Bentele, Karl Keys, Pat Delahanty, 
Ed Monahan, Gerald Neal, Rob Sexton, Phil Patton, Joe Bouvier, David 
Harshaw, and David Barron for sharing their expertise, and the staff members of 
the Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial help. 
1 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
2 This note distinguishes between disparity, a statistical phenomenon, and 
discrimination, a human behavioral phenomenon. Furthermore, this note 
assumes that disparity correlated with a victim’s race and disparity correlated 
with a defendant’s race equally constitute racial disparity. 
3 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 (admitting that “[t]he Baldus study indicates 
a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race” but asserting that “[a]pparent 
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system”). 
But this is not to say that the Court admitted to any complicity in racial 
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decided the 1972 landmark case Furman v. Georgia,4 which struck 
down then-existing state death penalty statutes as 
unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious, social scientists and 
legal scholars have produced a significant body of research 
showing death sentences to be correlated with the race of both 
murder victims (the highest rates being found in white-victim 
cases) and murder defendants (the highest rates being found in 
black-defendant cases).5 Public opinion polls suggest that a 
considerable portion of the public accepts race-of-defendant 
disparity in capital proceedings as a fact.6 
Nevertheless, almost every court—federal and state—to hear a 
statistically-based claim of racial discrimination in capital 
proceedings since 1987 has rejected it under cover of McCleskey.7 
                                                          
discrimination. See id. at 309-10 (cataloguing the Court’s “unceasing efforts to 
eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See discussion infra Part I.A. 
5 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990) 
(analyzing twenty-eight studies involving cases from 1972 to 1988), reprinted in 
136 CONG. REC. S6873, 6889 (1990); David C. Baldus et al., Racial 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical 
and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1638, 1738 (1998) [hereinafter Overview] (noting that “the problem of 
arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is a 
matter of continuing concern and is not confined to southern jurisdictions”). 
6 In a March 2001 Gallup poll, 50 percent of respondents agreed that a 
black person is more likely than a white person to receive the death penalty for 
the same crime. Gallup Poll Release 3/2/01, available at http://deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/article.php?scid=23&did=210#pew20030724. A 1991 Gallup poll found that 
73 percent of blacks and 41 percent of whites agreed that blacks are more likely 
to receive the death penalty than whites in similar cases. See WENDY KAMINER, 
IT’S ALL THE RAGE 103 (1995). 
7 See, e.g., Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 237 (4th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. 
Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 334 (5th Cir. 1998); Griffin v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1397, 
1401 (11th Cir. 1989); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 2002); 
Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 289 (Tx. Crim. App. 1999); Watkins v. Com., 
385 S.E.2d 50, 57 (Va. 1989). In United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 
2001) a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of 
a death notice after the government refused to provide discovery for a capital 
defendant’s selective prosecution claim. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
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These courts have been unwilling to accept the proposition at the 
heart of such statistically-based claims: that racial disparity, in the 
absence of race-neutral explanations for it, constitutes sufficient 
proof of unconstitutional discrimination. Moreover, attempts in 
Congress to respond to McCleskey by passing a Racial Justice Act, 
which would have provided a federal statutory vehicle for 
challenging racial disparity, have repeatedly failed.8 Nevertheless, 
since 1987 there have been a few isolated efforts by state 
governing institutions to respond to racial disparity in capital 
proceedings.9 
This note will examine two such institutional responses: the 
Kentucky Racial Justice Act10 and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s Proportionality Review Project.11 This note focuses on 
Kentucky and New Jersey because of their distinctions among 
death penalty jurisdictions: Kentucky is the only state with a Racial 
Justice Act on the books, and New Jersey is home to the court that 
has conducted the most thorough proportionality reviews of death 
                                                          
McCleskey did not pose any bar at that preliminary stage. Id. at 540. The 
Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous, per curiam opinion. U.S. v. Bass, 536 
U.S. 862 (2002). 
8 Don Edwards & John Conyers, The Racial Justice Act—A Simple Matter 
of Justice, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 699, 700-1 (1995) (discussing failed attempts to 
pass a Racial Justice Act in Congress between 1988 and 1994). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1108-10 (N.J. 1992) 
(discussed infra Part III.C.); the Kentucky Racial Justice Act, KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 532.300(1) (Michie 2004) (discussed infra Part II.B); N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 
470.30(3)(a) (McKinney 1995) (requiring the Court of Appeals to consider 
“whether the imposition of the verdict or sentence [of death] was based upon the 
race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for which defendant was 
convicted”); Foster v. State, 614 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1992) (4-3 decision) 
(dissenting opinion of Barkett, C.J., rejecting McCleskey as inconsistent with the 
Florida constitution). 
10 KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300(1) (Michie 2004). 
11 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the 1982 New Jersey death penalty statute and expressing the 
court’s commitment to performing thorough examinations of the imposition of 
the death penalty under the rubric of proportionality review). In July 1988 the 
court appointed Prof. David Baldus as Special Master to assist it in developing a 
system of proportionality review. State v. Marshall, 613 A2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 
1992). 
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sentences, including an intensive effort to ensure that racial 
disparity does not infect capital proceedings.12 Part I discusses 
McCleskey and the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty decisions 
that prepared the ground for it. Part II discusses a legislative 
response to McCleskey, the Kentucky Racial Justice Act. Part III, 
on the other hand, discusses a judicial response to McCleskey, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s Proportionality Review Project. 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the effectiveness of each state’s 
institutional response to racial disparity in capital proceedings, 
considers the two responses through the lens of relative 
institutional competence, and recommends some measures to help 
counteract this disparity. 
This note proceeds from two basic premises. The first is that 
racial disparity based on the race of murder victims is just as 
problematic, morally and legally, as racial disparity based on the 
race of murder defendants.13 The second is that racial disparity in 
                                                          
12 David Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the 
Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and 
Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1440 (2004) (noting that, “with the 
exception of Kentucky, no remedial legislation has been adopted” to address 
racial disparity in capital proceedings); Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality 
Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only the 
“Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 161 n.109 
(1996) (commenting on the New Jersey court’s “noteworthy” and “exceptional” 
commitment to proportionality review); Barry Latzer, The Failure of 
Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (With Lessons from New 
Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2001) (noting that “the New Jersey court 
committed itself to the most quantitative proportionality review in the United 
States”). 
13 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987) (noting that 
McCleskey had standing to raise an equal protection claim based on the race-of-
victim disparity, since a state would violate the Equal Protection Clause by 
enforcing its criminal laws on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, 
or other arbitrary classification” (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 
Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 12, at 1452-53 (arguing that race-of-defendant 
and race-of-victim discrimination are morally indistinguishable and identifying 
the immoral elements of race-of-victim discrimination). The immoral elements 
of race-of-victim discrimination include: 
a) its undervaluation of black lives, (b) its distortion of the decision-
making process on the basis of race, (c) the fact that race is a but for 
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capital proceedings is the product of racial discrimination—
although not necessarily conscious racial discrimination—by 
various actors in the system, including prosecutors, judges, and 
jurors.14 Significant support for this premise is found in studies of 
capital cases15 and in studies of white Americans’ attitudes about 
the death penalty.16 Researchers have identified racial prejudice as 
the strongest predictor of death penalty support among white 
Americans, ahead of such factors as income, education, and 
                                                          
cause of many death sentences and executions, (d) the unfairness it 
visits upon black communities, and (e) the unseemly message it sends 
that the overriding objective of capital punishment in America is the 
protection of white people. 
Id. 
14 For a discussion of unconscious racism and an argument favoring its 
recognition in equal protection analysis, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987). 
15 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 5; Baldus et 
al., supra note 5; William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and 
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 
599 (1980) (finding a high risk of powerful white-victim bias in Florida, Texas, 
and Georgia); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis 
of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 27, 108 (1984) (finding “a remarkably stable and consistent” 
pattern of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty in 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and 
Virginia); Gennaro F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: 
An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Decision-Making in the Post-Gregg 
Period, 79 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483 (1988) (finding that Kentucky 
prosecutors were more likely to seek death in white-victim cases); Leigh J. 
Bienen et. al, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role 
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 63 n.129 (1988) 
[hereinafter Reimposition] (finding pronounced race-of-victim and race-of-
defendant disparities unexplained by non-racial variables). 
16 See, e.g., Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudice and 
Support for the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 202 
(1994) (reporting results of statistically-controlled studies that “[w]hite support 
for the death penalty is . . . associated with antipathy to Blacks and with racial 
stereotyping”); Joe Soss et al., Why Do White Americans Support the Death 
Penalty?, 65 J. POL. 397, 416 (2003) (reporting results of statistically-controlled 
studies that “[w]hite support for the death penalty in the United States has strong 
ties to anti-black prejudice”). 
LESMAN MACROED 2-16-05.DOC 3/7/2005 7:27 PM 
364 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
political party affiliation.17 If one accepts that disparity manifests 
discrimination, it reasonably follows that racial disparity, 
unexplained by non-racial factors, violates the Constitution.18 Yet 
one need not recognize a causal connection between discrimination 
and disparity to believe that racial disparity in capital proceedings 
constitutes a serious social problem that must be remedied. The 
mere appearance of racial discrimination in the ultimate 
punishment, in a nation with a long history of racial subjugation, is 
at the very least unseemly, if not downright corrosive of our justice 
system.19 
The specter of racial discrimination haunts the death penalty 
system in America, yet officials in most jurisdictions have 
attempted to ignore it.20 The efforts of the Kentucky legislature and 
                                                          
17 Soss et al., supra note 16, at 412. 
18 Among the many arguments for recognizing racial disparity in capital 
proceedings as a basis for finding a constitutional violation, see, e.g., John H. 
Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1771 (1998) (proposing a burden-shifting scheme that would 
allow a defendant to make out an equal protection violation if prosecutors fail to 
rebut the defendant’s prima facie case, statistically based or otherwise); Scott 
W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the 
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial 
Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L.REV. 2083 (2004) (arguing that unconscious 
racial bias infects capital proceedings and that such bias skews the process of 
deciding who deserves the death penalty, making the resultant death penalty 
cruel and unusual punishment). On the other hand, Justice Antonin Scalia 
appears to believe that racial bias in capital proceedings does not necessarily 
present a constitutional problem. Justice Scalia, who voted to uphold 
McCleskey’s death sentence, wrote a memorandum to his fellow justices that 
included this remarkable admission: “Since it is my view that unconscious 
operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury 
decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the 
decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is 
more proof.” See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in 
Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 528 (1995) (citing the full text of the memorandum). 
19 See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance 
of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 433, 481 (1995) (“Courts lose respect when they refuse to acknowledge 
and remedy racial discrimination which is apparent to everyone else.”). 
20 Kentucky’s Racial Justice Act is the nation’s only statute allowing a 
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the New Jersey Supreme Court to confront this specter illustrate 
the difficulties in defining, isolating, and remedying problems 
where race and crime intersect. Although neither state institution 
has achieved unequivocal success or produced unambiguous 
lessons, the experiences of each are nonetheless instructive. They 
are also cause for some hope that the future of the death penalty 
will be more equitable than the past. 
I. TALISMAN: MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 
In 1987 the U.S. Supreme Court decided McCleskey v. Kemp, 
considered at the time to be the last broad-based attack on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.21 Warren McCleskey’s 
claims were crafted to take advantage of the death penalty 
jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court during the 
preceding fifteen years—the first fifteen years of the modern death 
penalty era, which dates from the Court’s invalidation of all capital 
statutes in Furman v. Georgia in 1972.22 In Furman the Court 
evinced concern about arbitrariness in capital sentencing23 and 
race- and class-based discrimination.24 McCleskey’s legal team put 
                                                          
defendant to challenge the prosecutor’s decision to seek death. See Baldus & 
Woodworth, supra note 12. The New Jersey Supreme Court is, arguably, the 
only state high court to take a rigorous approach to screening out racially 
discriminatory death sentences. See Bienen, supra note 12. 
21 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL 
JUSTICE 134 (1999). 
22 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291, 301; see also Anderson Bynam, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments—The Death Penalty Survives: McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987), 78 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1080, 1080-81 
(1988) (stating that, in Furman, “the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the 
requirements for death penalty statutes in order to satisfy the mandates of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” and asserting that McCleskey “drifted 
away from” the goal of “a high degree of rationality consistency in capital 
sentencing,” which the Court had espoused since Furman). 
23 The Furman Court held that arbitrariness violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 239-40, 256, 305-6 (1972). The Eighth Amendment provides: 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
24 Race- and class-based discrimination violates the Fourteenth 
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these concerns to the test with the first rigorous and comprehensive 
statistical study of how a state death penalty system operates.25 
McCleskey was thus able to point to data supporting his argument 
that the system that had put him on death row was both arbitrary 
and discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional.26 The Supreme 
Court, while accepting the validity of his data, did not accept his 
argument.27 
A. Background: Furman and Gregg 
In 1972 the Court decided Furman v. Georgia,28 which 
effectively invalidated all existing death penalty statutes. In 
Furman the Court issued a per curiam opinion supported by five 
separate concurrences; the common ground of the concurrences 
was the conclusion that in failing to guide judges and juries 
properly in their sentencing decisions, the Georgia and Texas 
capital punishment statutes under consideration produced death 
sentences that were so arbitrary and capricious as to be “cruel and 
unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.29 Justice Douglas’s 
concurrence openly acknowledged that racial minorities and the 
poor had always suffered most from this arbitrary scheme of 
                                                          
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879). The relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides, “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Bright, supra 
note 19, at 433-34. 
25 See Bynam, supra note 22, at 1106, 1110 (1988) (stating that in 
McCleskey “the Court was presented with unparalleled statistical evidence that 
the death penalty in Georgia was being applied in a racially influenced manner,” 
and that “[t]he only way to get better results than those provided by the Baldus 
study would be to ask the discretionary actors within the capital sentencing 
infrastructure whether they had discriminated in a particular case”). 
26 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-88. 
27 Id. 
28 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The case was consolidated with Jackson v. Georgia 
and Branch v. Texas. 
29 Id. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Eighth Amendment 
provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
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punishment.30 
Within six months of the Furman decision, states began 
enacting new death penalty statutes intended to address the 
deficiencies identified by Justice Douglas’s opinion and the four 
other opinions in support of the judgment.31 In 1976 the Court 
considered the first challenges to these statutes.32 In Gregg v. 
Georgia,33 Proffitt v. Florida,34 and Jurek v. Texas35 (collectively 
known as Gregg), the Court upheld death penalty statutes that 
provided judges and juries with sentencing guidelines by which to 
make the life-or-death decision.36 In addition to sentencing 
guidelines, Gregg also approved—but did not enshrine as 
constitutionally required—three procedural reforms featured in the 
new Georgia statute.37 The first was bifurcation of the trial, 
providing for separate deliberations on guilt and punishment.38 The 
                                                          
30 Id. at 355-56. (quotation from J. Douglas). See also Bright, supra note 
19, at 433-34 (stating that the Furman decision was “due to arbitrariness and 
discrimination against racial minorities and the poor”). 
31 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, HISTORY OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY, PART I, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15& 
did=410#ConstitutionalityoftheDeathPenaltyinAmerica (last visited Jan. 15, 
2005) (stating that, after the Furman decision, advocates of capital punishment 
began proposing new statutes that they believed would end arbitrariness in 
capital sentencing, and that Florida rewrote its death penalty statute only five 
months after Furman). 
32 Id. 
33 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
34 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
35 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
36 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 31. In deciding on 
the sentence, the judge or jury was to consider any of ten statutory aggravating 
circumstances supported by the evidence, as well as “any mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
164. The statutory aggravating factors included that “the offense of murder was 
committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive 
criminal convictions,” that the offense “was committed while the offender was 
engaged in the commission of another capital felony,” and that “the offender 
committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of 
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.” Id. at 165 n.9. 
37 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 31. 
38 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-64. The Georgia statute provided that after a 
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second was automatic appellate review of convictions and 
sentences.39 The third reform was proportionality review, by which 
state appellate courts could compare sentences in capital cases and 
determine whether a given sentence was disproportionately harsh 
in light of the crime and the defendant.40 
B. Warren McCleskey’s Powerful Case 
Warren McCleskey was convicted and sentenced to death in a 
Georgia state court for armed robbery and the murder of a white 
police officer.41 McCleskey challenged his sentence, grounding his 
arguments in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.42 First, he claimed that Georgia violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by administering 
the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner.43 McCleskey 
argued that race affected the application of the Georgia statute in 
two ways. First, defendants convicted of murdering whites were 
more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants convicted of 
murdering blacks.44 Second, black defendants were more likely to 
                                                          
verdict or plea of guilty, a sentencing hearing would be held at which the judge 
or jury would “hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and 
aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal 
convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or 
the absence of any prior conviction and pleas.” Id. 
39 Id. at 166-67. 
40 Id. at 167. Since Gregg, state high courts have differed as to what 
proportionality review entails, and how much judicial effort it deserves. See 
Bienen, supra note 12, at 132 (noting that proportionality review “can implicate 
broad principles of federal and state constitutional law and trigger the 
implementation of an empirical examination of the state’s entire capital case 
processing system, raising issues of racial and economic disparity and 
questioning the charging practices and autonomy of local prosecutors. Or, it can 
result in no more than a conclusory sentence tacked on to the end of a state high 
court’s affirmance of a death sentence.”). 
41 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
42 Id. at 286. 
43 Id. at 291-92. 
44 Id. at 291. 
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be sentenced to death than white defendants.45 McCleskey 
presented a wealth of statistical evidence from a study of more 
than 2,000 Georgia capital cases tried in the 1970s.46 The study, 
conducted by a team of researchers led by Professor David Baldus 
of the University of Iowa College of Law, produced some 
remarkable findings.47 It revealed that prosecutors sought the death 
penalty in 70 percent of cases involving black defendants and 
white victims, but just 19 percent of cases involving white 
defendants and black victims.48 Defendants received death 
sentences in 22 percent of cases involving black defendants and 
white victims, but just 3 percent of cases involving white 
defendants and black victims.49 After subjecting the data to an 
extensive analysis that accounted for 230 variables that could have 
provided non-racial explanations for these disparities,50 Baldus 
concluded that Georgia defendants who killed whites were 4.3 
times more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants who 
killed blacks.51 This was the most sophisticated and powerful 
evidentiary showing a capital defendant had ever made.52 
McCleskey also argued that because of the significant 
demonstrated risk that race, an arbitrary factor, played a role in 
capital sentencing, the Georgia system violated the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.53 This 
                                                          
45 Id. The Court noted that McCleskey had standing to raise an equal 
protection claim based on the race-of-victim disparity, since a state would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause by enforcing its criminal laws on “an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” Id. 
at 291 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 Id. at 286-87. 
47 Id. at 287. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 286. 
50 For example, one variable was whether or not the defendant was the 
prime mover behind the homicide; another was whether or not the defendant had 
a prior record of conviction for murder, armed robbery, rape, or kidnapping with 
bodily injury. Id. at 355, n.9 & 10. 
51 Id. at 287. 
52 See Bynam, supra note 22, at 1106. 
53 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 299 (1987). 
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argument followed directly in Furman’s footsteps.54 
By a one-vote margin the Court rejected McCleskey’s claims.55 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began his analysis by 
affirming the rule that a defendant who alleges an equal protection 
violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful 
discrimination.56 Justice Powell concluded that McCleskey’s equal 
protection claim must fail because he had not shown that any 
authorities had acted with the requisite intent to discriminate in his 
particular case.57 In addition, Justice Powell pointed out that 
McCleskey had failed to show that the Georgia legislature 
maintained its system of capital punishment because of, not in 
spite of, the system’s racially discriminatory effect.58 As for 
McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim, Justice Powell stated that 
because the sentence was imposed under procedures that focused 
the sentencer’s discretion on the particular crime and the particular 
defendant, the Court would presume that McCleskey’s death 
sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed in violation 
of Furman.59 Finally, Justice Powell concluded that the degree of 
risk of racial discrimination against McCleskey was acceptable 
under the Eighth Amendment because discrimination was a by-
product of discretion, which plays a fundamental and valuable role 
in the criminal justice system.60 
At the end of the McCleskey opinion, Justice Powell lifted the 
veil on the policy concerns behind the Court’s decision. He noted 
that if the Court crafted a rule under which racial disparity 
                                                          
54 See 481 U.S. at 322 (“Since Furman v. Georgia, the Court has been 
concerned with the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the 
proven fact of one.”) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
55 481 U.S. at 291-92, 308. 
56 Id. at 292. 
57 Id. at 297. 
58 Id. at 298. 
59 Id. at 308. 
60 Id. at 313. The Court cited Gregg v. Georgia in support of the 
proposition that, under a statute providing guided discretion, the existence of 
discretion at each stage of the criminal justice system does not violate the 
Constitution. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 307 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 199 (1976). See also cases cited supra note 33 and note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
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invalidates capital sentencing decisions, it would face claims that 
racial disparity should invalidate punishments in much of the rest 
of the criminal law.61 Justice Powell also asserted that legislatures 
are better equipped than courts to interpret and respond to large-
scale studies such as the one McCleskey presented.62 In short, the 
Court contended that “McCleskey’s wide-ranging arguments that 
basically challenge the validity of capital punishment in our 
multiracial society” called for a response beyond the Court’s 
institutional competence. 63 
C. A Failed Attempt to Respond: The Federal Racial Justice 
Act 
The first legislative attempt to respond to McCleskey came 
from Congress in the spring of 1988. Led by Representative John 
Conyers (D-Mich.) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), 
several members began work on legislation to address the racial 
disparities highlighted by the case.64 The ill-fated Racial Justice 
Act sought to remedy racial discrimination in capital sentencing 
through the exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The Act’s sponsors 
responded to the McCleskey Court’s holding that only intentional 
discriminatory actions are remediable by expressly allowing 
statistical evidence of disparate impact to raise an inference of 
                                                          
61 481 U.S. at 314-15. Justice Powell contended that “[a]pparent disparities 
in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 312. 
62 Id. at 314-19. 
63 Id. at 319. Justice Powell asserted that legislatures “are better qualified to 
weigh and ‘evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local 
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts’” 
Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186). See infra Part IV.B for a comparison of the 
legislative and judicial responses to racial disparities in capital proceedings. 
64 Paul Schoeman, Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A 
Compromise Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 543, 551 (1995). See also Edwards and Conyers, supra note 8, at 700 & 
n.39. 
65 H.R. REP. NO. 103-458 (1994). Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment reads: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.” 
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unlawful racial discrimination.66 The sponsors noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had already recognized the validity of such 
showings in the contexts of jury venires, jury selection, voting 
rights, and employment.67 Although the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed versions of the Racial Justice Act in 1990 
and 1994, the legislation never cleared the House-Senate 
conference process and never became law.68 
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE KENTUCKY RACIAL JUSTICE ACT 
In the modern death penalty era, Kentucky has been a 
relatively quiet death penalty jurisdiction. Since 1976 the 
Bluegrass state has executed only two persons, both of whom were 
white.69 Its death row currently houses thirty-five inmates, of 
                                                          
66 Id. 
67 Id. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that showing of 
racial disparity in peremptory strikes of venire members established prima facie 
case of discrimination, which, unrebutted, established violation of equal 
protection); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (stating that voting structure’s significant adverse 
impact on minority group, unsupported by neutral justification, could make 
structure unconstitutional); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (holding 
that showing of racial or ethnic disparity in grand jury venires established prima 
facie case of discrimination, which, unrebutted, established violation of equal 
protection); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) 
(holding that, under Civil Rights Act of 1964, showing pattern of practice of 
racially differential treatment, unless rebutted, constitutes violation of Act); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that complaint alleging 
that new voting district that removed 99 percent of black voters from city 
constitutes due process and equal protection violation sufficiently stated cause of 
action). 
68 See Edwards & Conyers, supra note 8, at 700-1; Schoeman, supra note 
64, at 553. Opponents of the Act expressed the view that it was unnecessary and 
that if passed it would make carrying out death sentences impossible. See, e.g., 
136 CONG. REC. S. 6885 (daily ed. 1990) (statement of Sen. Graham) (“This act 
would effectively end the ability of States to constitutionally apply the death 
penalty.”). 
69 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH ROW 
U.S.A (Fall 2004), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/ 
drusa/DRUSA_Fall_2004.pdf [hereinafter Death Row U.S.A.]. In number of 
executions, Kentucky ranks 26th (tied with Montana and Oregon) among the 33 
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whom seven are black and one is Latino.70 Thus, Kentucky’s death 
row is 20 percent black, while the state’s black population is 7.3 
percent.71 
Despite its low rate of executions in the modern death penalty 
era, Kentucky has a disturbing history of racial violence.72 The Ku 
Klux Klan was a powerful force in Kentucky for decades following 
its inception in 1868, terrorizing blacks, Union Army veterans, and 
Freedmen’s Bureau agents.73 Between 1860 and 1939, Kentucky 
had 353 lynchings, 258 of which targeted blacks.74 This figure 
includes eighty-five lynchings of blacks on suspicion of rape or 
attempted rape.75 Even when official trials took place during this 
period, mobs outside courtrooms frequently demanded that courts 
impose the death penalty when blacks were accused of rape or 
murder.76 Throughout the period from 1860 to 1960, blacks were 
consistently executed at rates disproportionate to their presence in 
                                                          
jurisdictions that have put inmates to death since 1976. Id. 
70 KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PROFILES OF KENTUCKY 
DEATH ROW INMATES, at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/inmateinfo/ 
deathrow.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
71 Id.; U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, KENTUCKY QUICKFACTS, at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
This comparison is not intended as evidence of disparity in death penalty 
proceedings, since the relevant population for that determination would be 
persons accused of committing aggravated murder. This comparison is made 
simply to provide a snapshot of the racial makeup of death row and the state as a 
whole. 
72 See Defendant’s Motion to Bar the Commonwealth from Subjecting Him 
to a Sentence of Death Sought on the Basis of Race, Commonwealth of 
Kentucky v. Nathaniel Wood (Barren Circuit Court 2003, No. 01-CR-00059, on 
file with the Journal of Law and Policy) [hereinafter Wood motion] (discussing 
Kentucky’s history of slavery, segregation, and racial violence); Gerald Neal, 
Not Soft on Crime, But Strong on Justice: The Kentucky Racial Justice Act: a 
Symbol, a Statement of Legal Principle, and a Commitment to Systemic 
Fundamental Fairness (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Law 
and Policy) (noting that “[t]he end of the Civil War ushered in a prolonged 
period of racial violence in Kentucky”). 
73 Wood motion, supra note 72, at 14. 
74 Id. at 18; Neal, supra note 72, at 3. 
75 Neal, supra note 72, at 3. 
76 Wood motion, supra note 72, at 22. 
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the Kentucky population.77 Perhaps Kentucky’s most significant 
distinction as a death penalty state is that it was the last to carry out 
a public execution, the 1936 hanging of Rainey Bethea, a young 
African-American man, before a festive crowd of 20,000 
spectators in Owensboro.78 
A. The Context for Kentucky General Assembly Action 
In 1992 the Kentucky General Assembly passed a bill calling 
for a study to determine whether racial bias played any role in 
death sentencing in the state.79 To that end, the state commissioned 
two University of Louisville professors, Thomas J. Keil of the 
Sociology Department and Gennaro F. Vito of the School of 
Justice Administration, to study the prosecution of all homicides in 
Kentucky from 1976 to 1991.80 
Professors Keil and Vito had already studied the effect of race 
on Kentucky capital proceedings, using data from December 1976 
to October 1986, and published their results in 1988.81 In that study 
Keil and Vito reported that, by simple numerical comparison, a 
higher percentage of blacks accused of killing whites (44.7 
percent) went before a “death-qualified jury”82 than blacks accused 
                                                          
77 Id. at 25. Of 164 persons executed between 1911 and 2000, 52 percent 
were black. Neal, supra note 72, at 3. 
78 Wood motion, supra note 72, at 21. 
79 Neal, supra note 72, at 9. 
80 Racial Justice Act Becomes Law: Not Soft on Crime, But Strong on 
Justice, THE ADVOCATE, July 1998, at 5, available at http://dpa.ky.gov/ 
library/advocate/july98/Racial.html [hereinafter Racial Justice Act Becomes 
Law]. 
81 Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: An 
Analysis of the Factors Influencing Decision-Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 
79 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483 (1988). 
82 A death-qualified jury is one composed of jurors who have said that they 
could fairly consider the death penalty as a sentence and that they would not 
automatically vote for or against death if they find the defendant guilty of capital 
murder. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Because a death-
qualified jury is a necessary condition for a capital trial, and because district 
attorneys have a great deal of discretion in seeking a death sentence as long as at 
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of killing other blacks (12.9 percent) or whites accused of killing 
blacks (0 percent).83 Among black defendants tried for a capital 
offense, 63.6 percent were accused of killing whites.84 
Furthermore, among those blacks who actually received death 
sentences, 87.5 percent had been convicted of killing whites.85 
After subjecting this data to statistical analysis that controlled for 
non-racial factors that may have led to death sentences,86 
Professors Keil and Vito still found that prosecutors were more 
likely to seek the death penalty for blacks accused of killing whites 
than in other homicide cases.87 However, the study did not reveal a 
statistically significant correlation between black defendant-white 
victim cases and death sentences, suggesting that capital jurors’ 
racial considerations were negligible.88 Thus, it appeared that 
prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty accounted for the 
heightened risk that blacks accused of killing whites would end up 
on death row.89 
When Professors Keil and Vito released their state-
commissioned report in 1993, their findings were largely 
consistent with those in their 1988 study and with some of the 
Baldus team’s findings in McCleskey.90 By simple numerical 
comparison, black defendant-white victim cases were more likely 
to be prosecuted capitally than cases with any other defendant-
victim racial combination.91 At trial, a Kentucky defendant was 
                                                          
least one statutory aggravating factor is present, in Keil and Vito’s study a 
death-qualified jury serves as a statistical proxy for the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney’s decision to seek death. See Keil & Vito, supra note 81, at 500. 
83 Keil & Vito, supra note 81, at 499. 
84 Id. at 498. 
85 Id. 
86 Non-racial factors included, for example, the sex of the victim and 
whether the defendant had a prior conviction for a violent offense. Id. 
87 Id. at 502. 
88 Id. at 501. 
89 Keil & Vito, supra note 81, at 502. 
90 Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in 
Kentucky Murder Trials, 1976-1991: A Study of Racial Bias as a Factor in 
Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. J. OF CRIM. JUSTICE 17, 26-30 (1995) (reporting and 
discussing 1992-93 state-commissioned findings). 
91 Id. at 26. Prosecutors sought death in 33 percent of black defendant-
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more likely to receive a death sentence if convicted of killing a 
white person than a black person, and a black defendant convicted 
of killing a white person was the most likely of all to receive a 
death sentence.92 Unlike the 1988 study, the 1993 study indicated 
that the defendant-victim racial combination did affect jurors’ 
sentencing decisions.93 Keil and Vito found that the black 
defendant-white victim combination was a significant factor in 
both the likelihood of capital prosecution and the likelihood of 
death sentence, even after statistical analysis accounting for factors 
such as multiple-victim crime, defendant’s prior criminal record, 
and personal relationship between defendant and victim.94 Keil and 
Vito concluded that, although the exact source of discrimination 
was impossible to pinpoint,95 “the impact of race upon 
prosecutorial deliberations cannot be justified by the presence of 
other, legitimate factors.”96 The researchers further concluded that 
juries “considered the killing of a White by a Black more 
deserving of capital punishment” than other racial combinations.97 
After failed attempts in the 1994 and 1996 legislative sessions, 
Senator Gerald Neal, then the Kentucky Senate’s only African-
American member, introduced the Kentucky Racial Justice Act in 
the 1998 session.98 The Commonwealth’s Attorneys opposed the 
KRJA and backed attempts to dilute it with floor amendments.99 
After two hours of vigorous debate, the legislation passed the 
Senate by a vote of 22 to 12.100 Four days later another African-
                                                          
white victim cases, in 20 percent of white defendant-white victim cases, 17 
percent of white defendant-black victim cases, and 14 percent of black 
defendant-black victim cases. Id. at 25. 
92 Id. at 30. 
93 Id. at 27. Professors Keil and Vito do not address this discrepancy in 
their journal article reporting on the 1993 study. Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 30. 
96 Id. at 26. 
97 Id. at 27. 
98 Neal, supra note 72, at 10. 
99 Id. at 9, 20. One Senate opponent of the KRJA characterized the vote as 
“a vote on whether we’re soft on crime.” Id. at 10. Sen. Neal countered, “I’m not 
soft on crime, I’m strong on justice.” Id. 
100 Racial Justice Act Becomes Law, supra note 80. 
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American legislator, Representative Jesse Crenshaw, introduced an 
identical bill in the House.101 During floor debate, Rep. Crenshaw 
introduced a letter from a retired African-American state judge and 
former prosecutor, who described the KRJA as “the least we can 
do to help erase the perception of minorities that they do not get a 
fair deal before the courts.”102 Again after vigorous debate, and 
after three amendments were defeated, the House passed the bill 70 
to 23.103 Three days later Governor Paul Patton, a Democrat, 
signed the nation’s first racial justice act into law.104 
B. The Provisions of the Kentucky Racial Justice Act 
Unlike the proposed federal act, which would have aimed 
Congress’s enforcement power at a tainted sentence after its 
imposition, the Kentucky Racial Justice Act (KRJA) focuses on the 
period before trial, during which a Commonwealth’s Attorney 
(Kentucky parlance for district attorney) decides whether or not to 
seek the death penalty in a given murder case.105 A Kentucky 
capital defendant who suspects that his race or the race of the 
victim provided the basis for the prosecution’s decision to seek 
death may allege a violation of the KRJA at a pretrial 
conference.106 If the defendant so alleges, the court must schedule 
a hearing on the claim.107 If the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of a racial basis and the prosecution fails to rebut it, the 
court must order that a death sentence cannot be sought in that 
case.108 Thus while the federal Racial Justice Act would have 
attempted to counteract racial discrimination by prosecutors, juries, 
                                                          
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE RECORD ONLINE, at 
 http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/recarch/98rs/SB171.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2005). 
105 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (Michie 2004). 
106 9 LESLIE ABRAMSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 31.31 (West 2004). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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or both, the KRJA is aimed solely at checking racial discrimination 
by prosecutors.109 
The Kentucky Racial Justice Act proclaims, “No person shall 
be subject to or given a sentence of death that was sought on the 
basis of race.”110 The statute provides that a defendant may 
establish that race was “the basis” of a decision to seek death “if 
the court finds that race was a significant factor in decisions to 
seek the sentence of death in the Commonwealth at the time the 
death sentence was sought.”111 Thus, on the face of the statute, 
statewide practice, rather than county practice, appears to be the 
benchmark.112 The statute expressly recognizes that statistical 
evidence is relevant to this “significant factor” determination—in 
stark contrast to the distrust of statistics embodied in McCleskey 
and its progeny.113 Following the proposed federal act’s lead, the 
KRJA accounts for both race-of-defendant discrimination and 
race-of-victim discrimination.114 A defendant may show that death 
was sought “significantly more frequently” for persons of one race 
than persons of another race (race-of-defendant discrimination)115 
or that death was sought “significantly more frequently” as 
punishment for capital offenses against persons of one race as 
compared to another race (race-of-victim discrimination).116 
Lest the KRJA seem like a defendant’s dream, however, the 
final two subsections erect a high evidentiary wall for the 
defendant to surmount.117 The defendant must “state with 
particularity how the evidence supports a claim that racial 
considerations played a significant part in the decision to seek a 
                                                          
109 H.R. REP. NO. 103-458 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (Michie 
2004). 
110 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(1) (Michie 2004). 
111 Id. § 532.300(2). 
112 But see text accompanying notes 118-19 and 163-64. 
113 Id. § 532.300(3); see McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312, for Justice Powell’s 
comment that “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our 
criminal justice system.” 
114 Id. 
115 KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300(3)(a) (Michie 2004). 
116 Id. § 532.300(3)(b). 
117 See id. §§ 532.300(4), (5). 
LESMAN MACROED 2-16-05.DOC 3/7/2005 7:27 PM 
 RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 379 
death sentence in his or her case.”118 This provision appears to 
conflict with the provision permitting prosecutorial decisions “in 
the Commonwealth”—presumably meaning statewide—to serve as 
the benchmark for determining whether or not race was the basis 
for the death notice in a particular defendant’s case.119 In addition, 
the defendant has the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that race was the basis of the decision to seek death in his 
case, and the prosecution may offer evidence in rebuttal.120 
C. Effects of the Kentucky Racial Justice Act 
Seven years after the KRJA’s passage, its effects remain 
murky. Attempts to measure the Act’s effect on defendants are 
complicated by the fact that its provisions are designed to operate 
before trial.121 If a defense lawyer uses the KRJA to stave off a 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s death notice, the issue is almost 
certain not to reach the appellate court, especially if the lawyer 
does so through informal negotiation rather than a formal 
motion.122 Presumably a failed KRJA motion would be more likely 
than a successful one to create an issue on appeal, but Kentucky 
appellate courts have yet to address the KRJA in a published 
opinion.123 
Still, there are other indirect ways to try to assess the KRJA’s 
impact. In particular, it is worthwhile to examine the Kentucky 
Supreme Court’s treatment of claims of racial discrimination in 
capital proceedings, however such claims were couched, before 
                                                          
118 Id. § 532.300(4). 
119 Id. § 532.300(2); see discussion accompanying notes 163-64. 
120 Id. § 532.300(5). 
121 KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300 (Michie 2004). 
122 9 LESLIE ABRAMSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 31.32 (West 2004) The Commonwealth must give 
defense counsel “adequate notice” that it will seek the death penalty. Id. (citing 
Perdue v. Com., 916 S.W.2d 148 (Ky.1995)). 
123 Online searches of WestLaw and LexisNexis produced no Kentucky 
cases containing the term “Kentucky Racial Justice Act” or its statutory section 
number as of Jan. 15, 2005. 
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and after the Act’s passage in 1998.124 Although the KRJA is 
intended for use in trial courts, it is reasonable to postulate that the 
state’s highest court has taken the Act into account in its 
jurisprudence.125 
In the 1987 case of Stanford v. Commonwealth, a black 17-
year-old was tried as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to death 
for the rape and murder of a white woman.126 The Kentucky 
Supreme Court rejected Kevin Stanford’s claim that the statute 
providing for referral of juvenile cases to adult criminal court had 
been applied in an unconstitutional manner by over-representing 
blacks in such transfers.127 The court acknowledged the “disturbing 
statistic” that during the period from 1975 to 1979, 68 percent of 
the juveniles transferred to adult court were black, even though 
blacks made up only 30 percent of juvenile cases.128 Nevertheless, 
it noted that Stanford’s statistical showing indicated that black 
juveniles had committed more than half of all the homicides and 
robberies and nearly half the assaults and rapes.129 More important 
to the court, however, was the fact that the statistics did not 
indicate how many of the adult court transfers involved repeat 
offenders (like Stanford), for whom previous state attempts at 
rehabilitation had proved unsuccessful.130 Implicit in the court’s 
mention of repeat offenders is the idea that recidivism is a non-
racial factor that presumably would correlate strongly with transfer 
to adult court. The court finished its paragraph on the 
                                                          
124 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
125 This examination is meant to assess three alternative hypotheses: 1) that 
the Kentucky Supreme Court understood the KRJA as a signal from the 
legislative branch to give greater credence to racial discrimination claims in 
death cases; 2) that the court understood the KRJA to mean that such claims are 
to be handled pre-trial, thus justifying a less rigorous approach on appeal; or 3) 
that the court has ignored the Act. 
126 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987). This decision was handed down on April 
30, 1987, just eight days after McCleskey; the Kentucky court makes no mention 
of the landmark case. 
127 Id. at 791. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. The court did not explain how these facts justify the 68 percent 
transfer figure. 
130 Id. 
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discrimination claim resoundingly: “We are not at all persuaded by 
Stanford’s statistics and find no evidence whatsoever to convince 
us that Stanford or any other juvenile was directly or indirectly the 
victim of racial discrimination.”131 
Seven years later and four years before the passage of the 
KRJA, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered Bussell v. 
Commonwealth.132 Charles Bussell, a black defendant convicted 
and sentenced to death by an all-white jury for the murder of a 
white woman, claimed that the death penalty in Kentucky operated 
in an arbitrary, discriminatory, and freakish manner.133 Bussell 
relied on the Keil and Vito study commissioned by the General 
Assembly to support his structural challenge to the application of 
the death penalty statute.134 Citing McCleskey and a Kentucky case 
that followed in 1990, the court rejected his claim.135 In its brief 
explanation, the court stated that the Keil and Vito study “indicates 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to control any perceived racial bias 
through judicial review.”136 The court stated that it must avoid 
“any kind of actual or perceived institutional racism that would 
contribute” to death sentences, but concluded that, “[i]n [Bussell’s] 
                                                          
131 Id. In June 2003 Gov. Paul Patton commuted Kevin Stanford’s death 
sentence to life imprisonment, citing the “injustice” of sentencing a juvenile 
offender to death. Henry Weinstein, Death Sentence Commuted for Ky. Man 
Who Killed at 17, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 22, 2003, at 36. 
132 882 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1994). 
133 Id. at 115. 
134 Id. For a discussion of this study, see infra Part II.A. 
135 Bussell, 882 S.W.2d at 115. 
The United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp . . . rejected a 
similar type of challenge to the application of the death penalty statute 
in Georgia. Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665 (1990), 
held that the argument that the death penalty in Kentucky operates in an 
arbitrary, discriminatory and freakish manner has been repeatedly 
presented, considered and dismissed. 
Id.  
136 Id. Although the court did not elaborate on this statement, it could be 
alluding to Keil and Vito’s comments that “the exact source of discrimination is 
difficult to pinpoint” and “[d]iscrimination did occur somewhere in this process 
but it is often subtle and difficult to discern.” Keil & Vito, supra note 90, at 30, 
31. 
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case, there [was] no logical connection between the crime, the 
imposition of the death penalty and racial bias.”137 In its two-
paragraph proportionality review,138 the court concluded, without 
citation or further explanation, that “[t]he sentence was not fixed 
because he was black or because the victim was white [but 
rather] . . . because he was found guilty as charged.”139 
As the Stanford and Bussell decisions illustrate, the court was 
plainly resistant to statistically-based claims of racial 
discrimination in capital cases before the KRJA’s passage.140 Even 
with the Act on the books, the court appears to have been no more 
receptive to such claims. In the 2003 case of Wheeler v. 
Commonwealth,141which involved a black defendant and two black 
victims, the court took just four sentences to dispatch the claim that 
the Kentucky death penalty was discriminatory, arbitrary, and 
disproportionate.142 The court pointed out that “[t]his Court and the 
United States Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected the 
statistical analysis presented by Wheeler as insufficient to 
invalidate a specific finding by a jury.”143 
                                                          
137 Id. 
138 Bussell, 882 S.W.2d at 116. Kentucky law provides for automatic 
proportionality review, in which the state Supreme Court determines “[w]hether 
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Michie 2002). The universe of cases for comparison is 
“all felony offenses in which the death penalty was imposed after Jan. 1, 1970.” 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(6)(a) (Michie 2004). 
139 Bussell, 882 S.W.2d at 116. This conclusory statement, which ignores 
the broad discretion prosecutors and juries exercise in capital proceedings, 
recalls Justice Powell’s dismissive remark in McCleskey that “a legitimate and 
unchallenged explanation for the [penalty] decision is apparent from the record: 
McCleskey committed an act for which the United States Constitution and 
Georgia laws permit imposition of the death penalty.” 481 U.S. at 297. 
140 See Neal, supra note 72, at 22. 
141 121 S.W.3d 173 (Ky. 2003). 
142 Id. at 186-87. 
143 Id. The court did not cite any U.S. Supreme Court precedents, but it did 
cite two of its own decisions in support of its rejection of Wheeler’s claim that 
the death penalty is arbitrary and discriminatory. See Woodall v. 
Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 104, 133 (2001) (rejecting white defendant’s claim 
that the death penalty is arbitrary and discriminatory with two citationless 
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Because no Kentucky Supreme Court opinion contains any 
mention of the KRJA,144 it is impossible to know if the court has 
understood the Act to mean that racial discrimination claims are to 
be handled before trial (and, therefore, if a defendant’s case 
appears on its docket, the capital prosecution against him must 
have passed KRJA muster), or if the court has simply ignored the 
Act. Given the court’s treatment of post-1998 claims of racial 
discrimination in capital proceedings, it is safe to infer that the 
court has not taken the KRJA as a signal from the legislative 
branch to give greater credence to racial discrimination claims in 
capital cases. 
While capital defendants have made no discernible headway in 
the Kentucky Supreme Court with claims of disparity, public 
defenders in the state have reported some instances of success in 
using the KRJA before trial.145 In September 2002 the Kentucky 
Department of Public Advocacy surveyed the state’s public 
defenders, asking about their experiences using the KRJA and their 
views on its effects.146 Of the sixty-four public defenders who 
returned the survey, only four reported having had a case that 
involved the KRJA.147 In one such case, with a white victim, the 
Jefferson County Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney initially 
declined to make a plea offer, citing an unspecified policy.148 
                                                          
sentences: “Woodall claims that the death penalty in Kentucky is 
unconstitutionally arbitrary and insidiously discriminatory. This Court has 
previously rejected similar arguments as stated above.”); Bowling v. 
Commonwealth, 873 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1993) (finding death sentence for white 
defendant who killed two people and wounded infant proportionate). These 
citations can only be taken to refer to procedural proportionality review, since 
proportionality is the only issue Wheeler, Woodall, and Bowling all have in 
common. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Michie 2004) (requiring 
state supreme court to determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the 
crime and the defendant”). Thus the court appears not to distinguish between its 
review of constitutional claims and its proportionality review. 
144 See supra note 123. 
145 Neal, supra note 72, at 12-13. 
146 Id. at 12. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 13. 
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Defense counsel prepared to argue that the defendant did not 
receive an offer because the victim was white and moved to 
discover the policy of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office 
concerning plea bargaining in capital cases.149 Defense counsel 
subpoenaed the county Commonwealth’s Attorney and the 
Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney on the case.150 Although the 
court quashed all subpoenas and denied the defense motion on the 
Commonwealth’s plea bargain policy, prosecutors eventually 
offered the defendant life imprisonment with parole eligibility.151 
Two other public defenders reported similar scenarios, in which 
they responded to the Commonwealth’s death notices with 
motions, citing the KRJA, to discover the prosecutors’ charging 
history in potentially capital cases.152 In both cases, prosecutors 
subsequently made non-capital plea offers, which the defendants 
accepted.153 
When asked in the survey to comment on the symbolic 
meaning of the KRJA, most public defenders’ comments were 
positive, ranging from unbridled enthusiasm154 to guarded 
optimism.155 However, when asked what effect they thought the 
KRJA actually had on race discrimination in Kentucky, public 
defenders’ comments were more negative than positive.156 One 
called the Act “nice to have . . . as a back up.”157 Another remarked 
that the KRJA “recognizes that bias is at least possible and is not 
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Neal, supra note 72, at 13. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. In both of these cases the Commonwealth’s Attorneys complied with 
the discovery requests—in one case, the Commonwealth’s Attorney did so 
before the court ruled on the motion. Id. 
154 Id. “The people of Kentucky, in adopting the Racial Justice Act through 
their elected representatives, have announced their complete rejection of the 
death penalty as a tool of discrimination.” Id. at 17. 
155 Id. “[T]he symbolism that Kentucky will not look the other way when 
the death penalty is to be applied in a racially discriminatory manner is 97 
percent of the value of the bill.” Id. at 17. 
156 See Neal, supra note 72, at 14. 
157 Id. at 14. 
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the result of defense counsel’s ingenuity.”158 Many others 
discerned a prosecutorial tilt toward, rather than away from, capital 
charging; as one defender put it, “the prosecutor [issues death] 
notices in each and every case where there is arguably an 
aggravator.”159 Some public defenders’ interpretations of 
prosecutors’ actions were, perhaps not surprisingly, cynical: 
“Prosecutors will still find excuses to treat African American 
defendants differently.”160 But at least one public defender noted a 
different interpretation of an increase in death notices, one that had 
been articulated by a Commonwealth’s Attorney in deciding to 
seek death for three African-American defendants accused of 
killing another African-American: “Not to seek death would 
devalue the worth of the life of the victim because of his race.”161 
On the subject of why the KRJA has not been used more, 
public defenders’ views varied. Some chalked it up to a simple 
lack of awareness of the Act.162 Others pointed out the practical 
difficulties involved, for example, “[i]n most counties, there are 
only a handful of eligible cases, far too few to draw any 
conclusions—particularly given the lack of racial diversity in those 
counties.”163 This comment suggests that, despite the KRJA’s 
statement that decisions to seek death “in the Commonwealth” are 
relevant to a particular defendant’s claim of a racial basis for 
capital prosecution, public defenders understand county-level 
statistics to be the benchmark.164 Another common theme was 
discomfort at broaching the subject of racism: “In a clear majority 
of counties, formally raising a Racial Justice Act motion would 
have dire consequences on the success of the defense attorney in 
                                                          
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 14-15. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 15. 
162 Id. at 18-19. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.; telephone interview with David Barron, Assistant Public Advocate, 
Frankfort, Kentucky, Oct. 31, 2004 (stating that public defenders view the 
relevant statistical sample for a KRJA challenge to be prior prosecutions in the 
county). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §532.300(2), discussion of this provision 
in Part II.B infra. 
LESMAN MACROED 2-16-05.DOC 3/7/2005 7:27 PM 
386 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that individual case and perhaps scores of other cases while the 
prosecutor cools down from being called a racist in the local 
paper.”165 
The prevailing view among Kentucky prosecutors and judges is 
that the KRJA has not had much impact on capital proceedings.166 
Joseph Bouvier, a 22-year veteran of the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney’s office in Fayette County, the state’s second-most 
populous county, said that Kentucky prosecutors expected a “flood 
of motions” after the KRJA passed but that the flood never 
came.167 Philip Patton, a state circuit court judge who served for 
eight years as Commonwealth’s Attorney in rural Barren County 
said he was unaware of the KRJA actually barring a death sentence 
in any case.168 Neither Mr. Bouvier nor Judge Patton believed that 
the KRJA had any appreciable effect on prosecutors’ charging 
decisions.169 Bouvier said he did not think that any 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys had attempted to change the racial 
make-up of their capital prosecutions, since they would then be 
discriminating in a different direction, and creating bigger 
problems for themselves.170 Bouvier opined that defense attorneys’ 
attempts to raise racial challenges to the death penalty have ebbed 
                                                          
165 Neal, supra note 72, at 17-19. 
166 Telephone interview with Phillip R. Patton, Circuit Court Judge, 43rd 
Judicial Circuit, Barren County, Kentucky (Nov. 26, 2003); Telephone interview 
with Joseph T. Bouvier, Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, Fayette County, 
Kentucky (Dec. 2, 2003). 
167 Bouvier interview, supra note 166. 
168 Patton interview, supra note 166. 
169 Id.; Bouvier interview, supra note 166; Patton interview, supra note 
166. In order to pursue a death sentence, a Kentucky prosecutor must file a 
notice of intention to seek the death penalty, in effect an addendum to the 
indictment. Telephone interview with David Harshaw, Assistant Public 
Advocate, Oldham County, Kentucky (Jan. 14, 2005). This “death notice” must 
identify the statutory aggravating factor(s) the prosecution intends to prove at 
trial. Id. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (Michie 2004). Even if not 
seeking death, a prosecutor must file a notice of aggravation, also identifying the 
statutory aggravating factor to be proved, in order to seek an “aggravated 
sentence” of life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment without 
parole for twenty-five years. Harshaw interview, supra. 
170 Bouvier interview, supra note 166. 
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and been replaced by attempts to raise awareness of the possibility 
of executing the innocent.171 
A look at death-sentencing outcomes, however, suggests that 
prosecutorial behavior has changed somewhat since the passage of 
the KRJA and that the perceived tilt toward seeking death may be 
real.172 In the five years before the KRJA, an average of 2.6 death 
sentences were imposed per year; in the five years after the Act’s 
passage, the figure was 2.8.173 There were twelve initial capital 
prosecutions (as opposed to re-trials after a judge vacated an initial 
sentence) in the five years after the Act’s passage, up from nine in 
the five years before passage.174 Strikingly, the only two death 
sentences imposed in Lexington in the five years following the 
KRJA’s enactment involved white defendants with black victims, 
and the only two death sentences in Louisville in this period 
involved black-on-black murders.175 
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S 
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 
Like Kentucky, New Jersey has seen relatively little death 
penalty activity in the modern era. The Garden State has executed 
no one since 1963, when Ralph Hudson, a white man, was put to 
death in the electric chair for murder.176 New Jersey currently has 
fifteen death row inmates, of whom seven are black and eight are 
                                                          
171 Bouvier interview, supra note 166. 
172 See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 12, at 1471-72. 
173 Id. at 1471. 
174 Id. at 1472. 
175 Id. Louisville, in Jefferson County, and Lexington, in Fayette County, 
are Kentucky’s two largest cities. KENTUCKY DEPT. OF TOURISM, KENTUCKY 
FACTS, at http://travel.ky.gov/facts_poplulations.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 
2005). Jefferson and Fayette Counties also have the highest percentages of 
African-American residents in the state: 18.9 percent and 13.5 percent, 
respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, KENTUCKY QUICKFACTS: JEFFERSON 
COUNTY, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21111.html (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2005); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, KENTUCKY QUICKFACTS: FAYETTE 
COUNTY, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21067.html (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2005). 
176 See Reimposition, supra note 15. 
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white.177 The death row population is thus 46.6 percent black, 
while the state’s black population is 13.6 percent.178 
Historically, New Jersey law imposed more severe 
punishments on blacks and Native Americans than on whites, even 
providing summary proceedings for the execution of slaves 
between 1714 and 1768.179 After 1768 slaves could still be put to 
death for manslaughter, stealing a sum above five pounds, and any 
other felony or burglary.180 In 1835 the state legislature, at the 
request of the governor, passed a law prohibiting public executions 
for blacks and whites alike.181 Since the beginning of the twentieth 
century the death penalty has played a relatively minor role in New 
Jersey criminal justice.182 In the period from 1900 to 1960, the 
highest number of death sentences imposed in a single year was 
sixteen, in 1930.183 In six of the years between 1900 and 1940, 
New Jersey courts imposed fewer than two death sentences, and in 
only four of the years between 1930 and 1960 were more than five 
death sentences imposed in a single year.184 
In the modern death penalty era, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, rather than the legislature, has acted most directly to 
confront racial disparity in the state’s death penalty system, and the 
court has done so chiefly in the context of proportionality 
review.185 The state’s criminal code provides for proportionality 
                                                          
177 See Death Row U.S.A., supra note 69. 
178 Id; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW JERSEY QUICKFACTS, at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). 
As with the Kentucky data, this comparison is not intended as evidence of 
disparity in death penalty proceedings, but simply as a snapshot of the racial 
makeup of death row and the state as a whole. 
179 Reimposition, supra note 15, at 48-49. 
180 Id. Although a gradual emancipation act was passed in 1804 (making 
New Jersey the last northern state to outlaw slavery), complete abolition was not 
effected until 1846. Eric Avedissian, Cape May’s Role in History: Pathway to 
Freedom, at http://capemay.com/capemayarchives/slavery.html (last visited Jan. 
17, 2005). 
181 Reimposition, supra note 15, at 53-54. 
182 Id. at 57-61. 
183 Id. at 60-61. 
184 Id. at 60. 
185 See Bienen, supra note 12, at 207-8 (noting that “[i]n spite of or perhaps 
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review of a death sentence “upon the request of the defendant” to 
“determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.”186 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to Georgia’s 
capital punishment statute in Gregg, two strains of proportionality 
review have emerged in state high courts. One is substantive 
proportionality review, which looks to whether the punishment of 
death is excessive for a particular offense.187 The other is 
procedural proportionality review, which examines whether a 
particular defendant’s death sentence is excessive when compared 
to factually similar cases.188 The New Jersey Supreme Court has 
interpreted this second aspect of proportionality review as “a 
means through which to monitor the imposition of death sentences 
and thereby to prevent any impermissible discrimination in 
imposing the death penalty.”189 
                                                          
because of the principled commitment of the New Jersey Supreme Court and its 
Proportionality Review Project, the court was sharply criticized by state 
legislators, the press, and the New Jersey Attorney General on capital 
punishment issues”). In January 2003 the New Jersey General Assembly (the 
larger house of the bicameral legislature) passed a death penalty study bill by a 
vote of 70-8. Emilie Lounsberry, A Tide of Doubt Is Rising About the Death 
Penalty, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 20, 2003. The study was to include an 
examination of whether selection and sentencing of defendants in New Jersey 
capital trials is arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory in any way. Id. After a 
compromise move to delete any mention of the study leading to a moratorium 
on the death penalty, the state senate passed the study bill 34-0. William Young, 
Thumbs Down to Death Penalty Study: Governor Calls It Redundant, N.J. 
LAWYER, Jan. 19, 2004, at 4. In January 2004 Governor James McGreevey, a 
Democrat, vetoed the bill, emphasizing his support for the death penalty and 
saying that there had already been enough studies. Id. 
186 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:11-3e. (West 2003). 
187 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1067 (N.J. 1992). 
188 Id. Substantive proportionality review is guided by the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment and any analogous state 
constitutional provisions. Henceforth, the term “proportionality review” in this 
note will refer only to procedural proportionality review. 
189 State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 292 (N.J. 1987). 
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A. The Genesis of Proportionality Review in New Jersey 
The history of proportionality review in New Jersey begins 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman,190 which 
prompted the New Jersey Supreme Court to declare the state’s 
death penalty law unconstitutional in 1972.191 After a decade of 
debate and deliberation, the legislature enacted a new death penalty 
statute that included mandatory proportionality review.192 New 
Jersey, along with twenty-five other states, carefully copied the 
Georgia statute upheld in Gregg.193 Like the Georgia law, the 1982 
New Jersey statute called for an automatic state supreme court 
determination as to proportionality for every capital sentence.194 
After the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Pulley v. 
Harris195 that, Gregg notwithstanding, the Eighth Amendment did 
not require procedural proportionality review, the New Jersey 
legislature amended the statute to require such review only when 
the defendant requests it.196 The amendment had no appreciable 
impact, however, as the New Jersey Supreme Court continued to 
conduct procedural proportionality review on the assumption that 
almost all capital defendants would request it.197 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court finally issued an opinion upholding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty statute in 1987,198 but it 
invalidated twenty-seven death sentences before affirming one 
                                                          
190 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
191 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1196. 
192 Id; 1982 N.J. Laws 555, 558 (providing that convictions resulting in 
death sentences may be appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which shall 
“determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed”). 
193 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1196. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) 
(West 2004). 
194 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1196-97. 
195 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
196 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1197; 1985 N.J. Laws 1935, 1940 (stating that 
the court, once the defendant has requested a review, shall examine “whether 
the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases”). 
197 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1197; State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 
1987). 
198 See Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 202 (finding that the death penalty statute did 
not violate the state or the federal constitutions). 
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under the “new” law in 1991.199 
In upholding the death penalty statute, the court emphasized 
that the proportionality review process was to be “an important 
procedural mechanism to safeguard against the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.”200 The court 
established at the outset that its system of proportionality review 
would not simply rely on traditional legal review, but would also 
seek the participation of criminal justice experts and perhaps even 
experts from disciplines outside the law.201 The court 
acknowledged that the death penalty statute provided little 
guidance in crafting a proportionality review system, providing 
simply that “the Supreme Court shall . . . determine whether the 
sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”202 
Looking forward, the court identified some proportionality 
review problems with which it would have to grapple.203 The first 
was determining the universe of cases within which the 
proportionality comparison would be made: should the focus be 
countywide or statewide, and should the universe include only 
actual death-sentenced cases or all cases in which the state could 
have sought death?204 The court recognized that this last question 
raised the issue of whether to consider possible misuse of 
prosecutorial discretion in seeking death.205 
The court faced another challenge in determining how to select 
                                                          
199 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1197. In eighteen successive decisions between 
1987 and 1990, the court vacated or reduced a death sentence or reversed a 
capital murder conviction on the basis of legal error. Baldus & Woodworth, 
supra note 12, at 1462 n.195. 
200 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 294. See also David Weisburd, Good for What 
Purpose? Social Science, Race, and Proportionality Review in New Jersey, in 
SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 258 (Patricia Ewick et al., eds., 
1999). 
201 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293. 
202 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 292 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 
2004)). 
203 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
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similar cases.206 It identified “sexual mutilation,” “torture,” and 
“multiple victims” as possible categories for comparison but 
worried that categories such as “domestic,” “execution style,” and 
“depravity of mind” might be too broad or ambiguous to allow any 
real comparison.207 Displaying its openness, the court wrote, “[w]e 
anticipate and welcome suggestions regarding which 
criminological, sociological, and statistical models are appropriate 
for analyzing the similarity of crimes and sentencing.”208 
The court also recognized that, even after identifying similar 
cases, it would face the problem of determining the defendants’ 
“relevant underlying characteristics.”209 The court stated that the 
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors would provide a 
starting point.210 However, the court also noted that “other factors 
                                                          
206 Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 2004)). 
207 524 A.2d at 293. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (c)(4) (West 2004). The aggravating factors 
that may be found by the jury or the court are: 
(a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. 
For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when 
sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor 
regardless of whether it is on appeal; (b) In the commission of the 
murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of 
death to another person in addition to the victim; (c) The murder was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim; (d) 
The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or 
in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value; (e) The 
defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or 
promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; (f) The murder was 
committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, 
punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the 
defendant or another; (g) The murder was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, 
or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, 
sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of 
contempt in violation of N.J.S. 2C:29-9b.; (h) The defendant murdered 
a public servant, as defined in N.J.S. 2C:27-1, while the victim was 
engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the 
victim’s status as a public servant; (i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a 
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such as race, sex, and socioeconomic status . . . the relationship 
between the defendant and victim, whether defendant pleaded 
guilty or not guilty, and the race and sex of the victim” were 
possibly appropriate factors to consider.211 Finally, the court 
candidly acknowledged the paradox inherent in the proportionality 
review process: although the “paramount theme” of the criminal 
justice system is that the punishment should fit the crime, not the 
criminal, the U.S. Supreme Court has categorically rejected “blind 
uniformity” in the sentencing of capital defendants.212 
B. A Statistical Study of New Jersey Capital Cases 
One year later, the New Jersey Supreme Court made good on 
its promise to seek outside assistance: in July 1988 the court 
appointed David Baldus, who had led the McCleskey study, as 
Special Master to assist with the creation of a system of 
proportionality review.213 Baldus spent three years collecting data 
and developing the methodology he would recommend in his final 
report.214 One year into the project, the state Attorney General 
                                                          
narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S. 2C:35-3 and in 
furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S. 2C:35-3, committed, 
commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the 
murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a 
narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S. 2C:35-3 in 
furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S. 2C:35-3; (j) The 
homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in 
violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:17-2 [causing 
“an explosion, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, release or 
abandonment of poison gas, radioactive material or any other harmful 
or destructive substance”]; (k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or 
(l) The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt 
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, 
terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 2002, c. 26 (C. 2C:38-2). 
N.J.STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3(c)(4) (2004). 
211 Ramseur,524 A.2d at 294. 
212 Id. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding 
mandatory death sentence for conviction of first-degree murder unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
213 State v. Marshall, 613 A2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 1992). 
214 Id. 
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applied to the Court for a preliminary determination of the 
appropriate universe of cases to be used in proportionality 
review.215 The Attorney General argued that, in keeping with a 
majority of other jurisdictions’ proportionality review systems,216 
the only appropriate universe would be one composed exclusively 
of cases in which a death sentence had been imposed.217 Baldus, on 
the other hand, recommended that the universe also include 
homicide cases that he determined to be clearly death-eligible but 
in which prosecutors had chosen not to seek the death penalty.218 
Because proportionality review is essentially an exercise in 
comparing similar cases, deciding which cases are sufficiently 
similar to include in a universe becomes crucially important.219 
The court declined to define the appropriate universe at that point, 
averring that its eventual decision would be better informed by 
awaiting Baldus’s final report and the arguments of interested 
parties (chiefly the Attorney General and the state Office of the 
Public Defender).220 
                                                          
215 In re the Proportionality Review Project, 585 A.2d 358, 358-59 (N.J. 
1990). 
216 Id. at 359. 
217 Id. As of July 1990, there had been 33 death sentences in 117 death-
penalty trials. Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See Dale Jones, The Office of the Public Defender, Race and 
Proportionality Review in New Jersey: The View from the Back of the Bus, 26 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1469, 1471 (1996). A small universe of cases with highly 
similar facts would make defense claims of disproportion difficult, since it 
would be hard for a defendant to distinguish himself from his death-sentenced 
peers in such a universe. A larger universe that included cases not prosecuted 
capitally would make defense claims of disproportion easier, since it would be 
possible to point to defendants who also committed murders of roughly equal 
aggravation but who did not face the death penalty. Considering the same issue a 
few years before, a justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court offered an analogy in 
support of a broad universe of cases: “If one wants to determine whether 
individuals are being discriminated against in public transportation, one does not 
merely look at those who are required to sit in the back of the bus and conclude 
that since everybody in the back of the bus looks alike, there is no 
discrimination.” State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 752 (Neb. 1986) (Krivosha, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
220 Proportionality Review Project, 585 A.2d at 360. 
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In his final report, Baldus provided the court with a database 
comprising 246 cases and more than 400 factors that detailed the 
social and criminal backgrounds of the offenders and their victims, 
the contexts of their crimes, and the procedural and legal issues 
that Baldus deemed relevant to capital cases.221 He provided the 
court with three distinct statistical methods for assessing the 
offenders’ culpability, or blameworthiness, a major factor in 
determining the proportionality of their sentences.222 Baldus also 
reported that he found race effects in the course of developing his 
statistical models: both the race-of-defendant and race-of-victim 
variables showed statistically significant correlations with death 
sentences.223 It appeared that black defendants were at a greater 
                                                          
221 Weisburd, supra note 200, at 263. 
222 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1077-78 (N.J. 1992). 
223 Weisburd, supra note 200, at 264-65. The Court had not actually 
requested an analysis of arbitrariness and discrimination in the state’s capital 
charging and sentencing system.  
224 Id. at 265-66. 
225 Id. (quoting Baldus, Final Report at 102). 
226 Id. at 266 (quoting Baldus, Final Report at 103). 
227 Id. at 268. 
228 613 A.2d 1059. The New Jersey Supreme Court had already affirmed 
Marshall’s conviction and death sentence on direct appeal in State v. Marshall, 
586 A.2d 85 (1991) (“Marshall I”). The Court reserved the proportionality 
review issue, and it was briefed and argued separately. 613 A.2d at 1062-63. In 
this note, “Marshall” refers to the proportionality review appeal, which the 
Court refers to as “Marshall II.” 
229 Id. 
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risk of receiving death sentences than similarly situated white and 
Hispanic defendants.224 The data suggested that, “on average, after 
controlling for the aggravation level of the cases, black defendants 
may have a 19 percentage point higher risk . . . of receiving a death 
sentence than do other defendants.”225 Furthermore, the data 
suggested that “on average, cases with a white victim may have a 
14 percentage point or higher risk of advancing to a penalty trial 
[i.e., being prosecuted as a capital murder case and producing a 
conviction] than do other cases.”226 Baldus cautioned, however, 
that these findings were strictly preliminary because discrimination 
was not the primary target of his analysis.227 
C. The First Use of Proportionality Review 
In State v. Marshall,228 a case involving a white insurance 
agent who hired a hit man to kill his wife (who was also white), the 
court had its first opportunity to apply Baldus’s newly-gathered 
data.229 But even before the court could draft an opinion, the state 
legislature stepped into the universe-of-cases debate on the 
Attorney General’s side.230 Following oral argument in Marshall, 
the legislature amended the Capital Punishment Act to provide that 
“proportionality review . . . shall be limited to a comparison of 
similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed.”231 
The Attorney General then filed a memorandum suggesting that 
this amendment be applied to Marshall’s proportionality review 
                                                          
230 613 A.2d at 1063. 
231 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 2004). 
232 613 A.2d at 1063. 
233 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 2004). 
234 613 A.2d at 1063, 1131. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of 
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”); art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State 
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law”); N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 par. 3 (“The 
Legislature shall not pass any . . . ex post facto law”). 
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appeal.232 The court noted that applying the amendment—which 
was to “take effect immediately”233—to pending appeals would 
implicate the federal Constitution’s ex post facto clause and the 
analogous clause of the New Jersey Constitution.234 Citing the long 
pendency of Marshall’s appeal (and displaying its independence), 
the court decided to apply pre-amendment law and decide for itself 
what universe of cases to use.235 After assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the competing approaches, the court decided that 
Baldus’s better served its need “to assess disproportionality in 
terms of the crime and the defendant.”236 
Among defendant Robert Marshall’s claims was a structural 
challenge to the state’s death penalty scheme—reminiscent of 
Warren McCleskey’s—based on the Special Master’s finding of a 
correlation between race and death sentences.237 Marshall pointed 
out that at the midrange culpability level (neither the most 
aggravated murders nor the least aggravated) there was a 64 
percent higher risk that a black defendant would be sentenced to 
death than a defendant of any other race.238 Furthermore, at this 
midrange level white-victim cases were 1.4 times more likely to 
                                                          
235 Id. at 1064. In addition to the Special Master’s report, the Court had 
before it a competing report, commissioned by the Attorney General and 
produced by statistician Herbert I. Weisberg. Id. at 1086. Dr. Weisberg proposed 
a more modest role for statistical analysis of past decisions, recommending that 
the universe of cases be limited to those capital trials in which a judge or jury 
had found at least one statutory aggravating factor, and limiting the independent 
variables to just the statutory aggravating factors (leaving out mitigating factors 
and extra-legal factors such as race). Id. This approach would shrink the 
universe of cases and make it impossible to assess what role the race of the 
defendant or victim played, if any. Id. 
236 Id. at 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
237 Id. at 1110. The New Jersey court found standing for Marshall to 
complain of race-influenced death sentencing: “Defendant surely has a right to 
raise a structural challenge to the constitutional fairness of the New Jersey 
Capital Punishment Act. A death-penalty statute that systematically 
discriminates on the basis of race of the victim or race of the defendant menaces 
the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State.” Id. at 1109 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the McCleskey Court found McCleskey had 
standing to raise an Equal Protection claim based on the race-of-victim disparity, 
since a state would violate the Equal Protection clause by enforcing its criminal 
laws on an unjustifiable standard such as race. See supra note 45. 
238 Id. 
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advance to a penalty trial than other cases.239 Noting that race 
effects are undetectable at the highest and lowest culpability levels, 
Marshall asserted that when juries are faced with real choices, that 
is, when crimes are neither so horrendous that the death penalty 
seems clearly appropriate to jurors, nor so borderline that the death 
penalty seems clearly excessive, race stands out as a predictive 
factor.240 
When the New Jersey Supreme Court finally decided Marshall, 
it repudiated the McCleskey Court’s assertion that racial disparities 
are inevitable in the American criminal justice system, proclaiming 
that “New Jersey’s history and traditions would never countenance 
racial disparity in capital sentencing.”241 The court did not, 
however, accept Special Master Baldus’s evidence of racial 
disparity in sentencing as conclusive.242 Although the court found 
“disturbing” the Special Master’s “suggestion” that there may be a 
discrepancy in capital sentencing rates based on race, it did not 
find evidence of “constitutionally-significant race-based disparities 
in sentencing.”243 The court contrasted the evidence of racial 
disparity in McCleskey, which issued from a “more extensive set of 
relationships between the statistical variables,” with the evidence 
in the Special Master’s report, which presented only “the rate at 
which black defendants are sentenced to death and the rate at 
which cases with white victims proceed to a penalty trial.”244 The 
Marshall data did not show the death-sentencing rate for race-of-
victim and race-of-defendant combinations, as the McCleskey data 
had done.245 Furthermore, the court pointed out that, despite 
apparent race-of-defendant disparities at the midrange culpability 
level, the same data showed no race-of-victim disparities in the 
penalty trial decisions.246 
Finally, the court emphasized Baldus’s observation that the 
                                                          
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1108-9. See quotation from Justice Powell, supra 
note 61. 
242 Id. at 1108. See supra text accompanying notes 223-26. 
243 Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1108. 
244 Id. at 1110. 
245 State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685, 712 (N.J. 1994). 
246 Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1111. 
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race-of-victim effect observed in cases advancing to penalty trial is 
less statistically stable (and therefore more questionable) than the 
race-of-defendant effect in death sentences.247 In short, the fact that 
Baldus had not constructed his statistical analysis specifically to 
test for race effects, combined with the small universe of cases he 
employed, led the court to refrain from stating definitively that 
New Jersey’s death penalty statute had a racially discriminatory 
effect.248 Comparing the case before it with Justice Brennan’s 
characterization of McCleskey, the court found that it did not yet 
confront a record in which “the statistical evidence relentlessly 
documents the risk that [the defendant’s] sentence was influenced 
by racial considerations.”249 
D. Post-Marshall Proportionality Review Cases 
In the next three proportionality appeals it heard in 1994 and 
1995—State v. Bey,250 State v. Martini,251 and State v. 
DiFrisco252—the court continued to express concern about 
findings that indicated some degree of racial disparity. In Bey the 
defendant was a black man sentenced to death for the sexual 
assault and murder of a black woman.253 Like Marshall, Bey raised 
a structural challenge to the New Jersey capital system on the 
ground that race operated as an impermissible factor in 
prosecutors’ charging decisions and juries’ sentencing decisions.254 
The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey 
and the New Jersey State Conference of NAACP Branches, as 
amici curae supporting Bey’s position, attempted to ameliorate the 
statistical deficiencies the Court had found in Marshall’s claim.255 
They evaluated the interaction between race-of-defendant and 
                                                          
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 1111-12 (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
250 645 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1994). 
251 651 A.2d 949 (N.J. 1994). 
252 662 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1995). 
253 645 A.2d 685. 
254 Bey, 645 A.2d at 689, 715. 
255 Id. at 713. 
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race-of-victim combinations and assessed the influence of non-
statutory factors such as socio-economic status.256 In an attempt to 
include enough cases for a statistically reliable comparison, the 
amici expanded Bey’s culpability level to embrace twenty-three 
cases.257 They then pointed out that in the expanded culpability 
level, 80 percent of black defendants (eight of ten) but only 15 
percent of non-black defendants (two of thirteen) received death 
sentences,258 and defendants who killed whites were more likely to 
receive death sentences than defendants who killed non-whites.259 
The court rejected Bey’s claim, finding that the statistics did 
not support it.260 The court objected to the expansion of Bey’s 
culpability level because it failed to “achieve the underlying 
purpose of creating culpability levels consisting of similar 
cases.”261 The fundamental problem, the court observed, was that 
the New Jersey case universe still contained too few cases to make 
analysis reliable.262 The court acknowledged that it was “vexing” 
to wait for more data, but stated that “[t]he inescapable fact is that 
we lack enough cases to conclude with any degree of statistical 
reliability whether race is working impermissibly in death 
sentencing.”263 
The defendants in Martini and DiFrisco (both white) raised the 
same claim as Bey.264 The court rejected Martini’s claim by 
referring to its holding in Bey,265 and it rejected DiFrisco’s claim 
by referring to its holdings in Martini, Bey, and Marshall.266 Eight 
years after its inception, the proportionality review project had yet 
to provide relief to a single death-sentenced defendant in New 
                                                          
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 715. 
260 Bey, 645 A.2d at 711-12. 
261 Id. at 714. 
262 Id. at 714. 
263 Id. at 712. 
264 J. Randy Sawyer, Comment, The Last Line of Defense: A Comparative 
Analysis of United States Supreme Court and New Jersey Supreme Court 
Approaches to Racial Bias in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 7 SETON 
HALL CONST. L.J. 663, 704 n.225 (1997). 
265 Martini, 651 A.2d at 987. 
266 DiFrisco, 662 A.2d at 473. 
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Jersey. 
E. The New Jersey Supreme Court Reconsiders Proportionality 
Review 
David Baldus’s tenure as Special Master ended with the 
proportionality appeal in Bey, and the state Administrative Office 
of the Courts (AOC) then took responsibility for producing 
ongoing analyses for proportionality review.267 In January 1996 the 
AOC released updated data, including thirty-two new cases, in 
preparation for proportionality review in State v. Harris.268 David 
Weisburd, a statistics expert retained by the AOC to analyze this 
data, reported that a black-defendant race effect had achieved 
statistical significance as a predictor of death sentences in penalty 
trials.269 Thus, the race effect that could have been dismissed as a 
mere statistical artifact in Baldus’s study now had stronger legs to 
stand on.270 Although striking, this development did not turn the 
tide in the argument between the Public Defender and the Attorney 
General about racial disparity.271 Instead, each side argued its own 
interpretation with renewed vigor.272 The Public Defender claimed 
that the AOC report “provided relentless and conclusive evidence 
of prejudice” in death sentencing, while the Attorney General 
challenged the statistical models’ ability to “measure what they 
purport to measure.”273 
In 1996 there were two deaths that altered the course of 
proportionality review.274 The first was that of Chief Justice Robert 
N. Wilentz, under whose leadership the court undertook the 
proportionality review project.275 Republican Governor Christine 
Todd Whitman appointed Attorney General Deborah Poritz to 
                                                          
267 Weisburd, supra note 200, at 277. 
268 662 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1995). 
269 Jones, supra note 219, at 1475. 
270 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
271 See Weisburd, supra note 200, at 277. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 280. 
274 See Bienen, supra note 12, at 186; Sawyer, supra note 264, at 704. 
275 See Bienen, supra note 12, at 136. 
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replace Wilentz as Chief Justice.276 The proportionality review 
project would henceforth operate under the supervision of someone 
who, at least in her institutional role, was one of its chief critics.277 
The second death was that of Joseph Harris, the defendant in State 
v. Harris, who suffered a stroke on the eve of his hearing.278 The 
case was dismissed as moot, and the battle over the AOC report 
was postponed.279 
The battle was joined in the proportionality appeal of State v. 
Loftin,280 which concerned a black defendant convicted of killing a 
white man in the course of robbing him. The court appointed a new 
Special Master, retired Appellate Division Judge Richard S. 
Cohen, to review the significance of the AOC’s data for Loftin’s 
case.281 Cohen, assisted by Princeton University statistician John 
Tukey, reported to the court in January 1997.282 Cohen and Tukey 
had created three new statistical models, each including the race of 
the defendant as a variable in a set of no more than ten variables, 
the rest of which were statutory aggravating or mitigating 
factors.283 Cohen reported that “the statistical evidence does not 
prove the defendant’s assertions of racial bias in penalty-trial 
verdicts, [but] neither does it prove that the system operates 
without bias.”284 
Just as the state had retained an expert to counter Special 
Master Baldus in past appeals, the defense in Loftin retained an 
                                                          
276 Id. at 209 n.284. 
277 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
278 Sawyer, supra note 264, at 704. 
279 Id. 
280 724 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1999). 
281 See Sawyer, supra note 264, at 705. 
282 State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 154 (1999). See also Weisburd, supra 
note 200, at 280. 
283 Id. 
284 724 A.2d at 154 (quoting Richard S. Cohen, Report to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey (Jan. 27, 1997)). In its February 1999 Loftin decision, the 
court reviewed the raw data on capital sentencing and noted that prosecutors 
sought death sentences against 36 percent (73/203) of the black defendants and 
47 percent (74/159) of the non-black defendants, while juries imposed death 
sentences on 38 percent (28/73) of the black defendants and 30 percent (22/74) 
of the non-black defendants. Id. at 155. 
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expert to counter Special Master Cohen.285 Defense statistician 
Paul Allison offered alternative statistical models that added a 
white-victim variable to the three Cohen-Tukey models, with the 
result that two of these models showed a statistically significant 
race effect.286 But the court, evincing considerably more 
skepticism about statistical analysis than it had in previous cases, 
dismissed Allison’s findings as “infected by [Baldus’s] suspect 
culpability ratings and the small size of the database.”287 In 
contrast, the court noted with approval Cohen’s determination that 
none of the results drawn from the AOC data could be considered 
statistically significant, including the “apparent racial disparity in 
penalty-phase verdicts.”288 Harkening to the standard that the 
Marshall court had plucked from Justice Brennan’s McCleskey 
dissent, the court concluded that “the record in this case convinces 
us that defendant has not ‘relentlessly document[ed] the risk’ of 
racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty.”289 
Along with its rejection of Loftin’s appeal, the court appointed 
yet another Special Master to “examine the proportionality review 
methodology used by the Court since Marshall . . . and to test the 
assumptions on which the current system is based.”290 Again the 
court appointed an Appellate Division judge, this time Judge David 
Baime, to be the new Special Master.291 
In his initial report of April 1999, Baime recommended 
retaining the “clearly death-eligible” universe of cases for 
proportionality review, ignoring the legislature’s 1992 amendment, 
just as the court had done.292 Baime also recommended the 
appointment of a retired judge as standing Special Master to 
supervise the proportionality review process.293 In keeping with the 
court’s desire to streamline the system, Baime recommended 
                                                          
285 Id. at 158. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 156. 
289 Id. at 160. 
290 Id. at 135. 
291 In re Proportionality Review Project, 735 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. 1999). 
292 Id. at 534. 
293 Id. 
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consolidating proportionality review with direct appeals.294 The 
court accepted these recommendations.295 
Most significantly, Baime recommended abandoning the 
complex statistical analysis that Baldus had championed, citing the 
instability of the statistical models and the small projected increase 
in the case database.296 The court acknowledged these 
shortcomings: “[T]here are too many independent variables 
(degree of victimization, extent of premeditation, nature of 
offense) in relationship to the relatively few dependent variables 
(death verdicts) to reach a reliable conclusion about the effect of 
the independent variables.”297 While the court agreed to abandon 
the analysis Baldus had instituted, it recognized that “[s]tatistical 
modeling certainly will be needed to examine systemic 
disproportionality.”298 The court directed the Special Master to 
work with his consultants, Professors David Weisburd and Joseph 
Naus, to create a more reliable model.299 
In December 1999, Baime issued the second part of his 
report.300 Whereas his initial report’s recommendations were aimed 
at individual proportionality review (the effort to ensure that 
individual death sentences are not disproportionately harsh in the 
universe of similar cases), Baime’s second report focused on 
systemic proportionality review (the effort to ensure that death 
sentences statewide do not fall disproportionately on ethnic and 
racial minorities.)301 He recommended a process specifically for 
monitoring the presence of racial discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty, a process that would combine 
three statistical techniques in an effort to isolate race effects.302 
                                                          
294 735 A.2d 528 at 543. 
295 Id. at 548. 
296 Id. at 534-35. 
297 Id. at 541. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168, 169 (N.J. 
2000). 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 172-73. These techniques are bivariate analysis, which looks at 
just two variables, race and sentence; multiple regression analysis, which 
isolates the individual effects of many independent variables on the sentence; 
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Baime asserted that creating a statistically stable, reliable 
model to test for race would be easier than creating such a model 
for individual proportionality.303 This was because he and his 
consultants would need to include in their model only those 
variables that were related to a particular outcome (for example, 
conviction or death sentence) and to race; they would not have to 
include the wide variety of variables relevant to the culpability of 
each offender.304 The court concluded that the variables must 
include non-statutory factors, and approved Baime’s plan to survey 
judges with experience in capital cases to select the non-statutory 
factors most relevant to death-sentencing decisions.305 In an effort 
to make racial coding more reflective of reality, the court also 
accepted the Special Master’s recommendation to code both 
defendants and victims as white, black, Latino, Asian, and other, 
abandoning Baldus’s system of coding defendants as black or non-
black and victims as white or non-white.306 
Finally, the court reiterated the standard for establishing 
disproportionality: a defendant must “relentlessly document the 
risk of racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty.”307 
The court also held that, to meet this standard, a defendant would 
have to show “converging outcomes produced by the application 
of a variety of techniques,” specifically, the three techniques 
Baime proposed.308 Considering the variation in results that 
different statistical analyses had produced in previous cases and 
the susceptibility of these results to differing interpretations, the 
court set the bar quite high.309 
                                                          
and case-sorting analysis, which looks at which combination of aggravating and 
mitigating factors were involved in cases in the universe, then identifies which 
combinations showed strong racial disparities. Id. at 172-77. 
303 Id. at 173-74. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 175. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 178. 
308 Id. 
309 The Court’s opinion was written by Chief Justice Poritz, who appears to 
have accepted the importance of the proportionality review project. (“The 
importance of understanding whether racial discrimination infects our system of 
capital punishment requires that we make this effort.”) In re Proportionality 
Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168, 172 (N.J. 2000). However, Chief Justice 
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In accepting the Special Master’s Report, the court 
simultaneously decided three proportionality review cases.310 
Citing Baime’s finding that there was no consistent statistical 
evidence of race-of-victim or race-of-defendant effects, the court 
concluded, “[W]e cannot find that race has operated as an 
impermissible factor in the imposition of the death penalty.”311 
Thus the court affirmed all three sentences.312 
In 2001 Baime delivered his Report to the Supreme Court 
Systemic Proportionality Review Project.313 In it, he stated, “[W]e 
discern no sound basis from the statistical evidence to conclude 
that the race or ethnicity of the defendant is a factor in determining 
which cases advance to a penalty trial and which defendants are 
ultimately sentenced to death.”314 Baime noted that all three 
analytical techniques produced convergent results, which bolstered 
his and his consultants’ confidence in the result.315 As for the race 
of the victim, Baime allowed that the results were “more 
equivocal.”316 Although he found no appreciable difference in 
sentencing rates between defendants who killed whites and 
defendants who killed minorities, he did find “unsettling” evidence 
that cases involving white victims were more likely to advance to 
penalty trials (i.e., to be pursued by prosecutors as capital cases 
and to produce convictions) than cases involving black victims.317 
Baime attributed this finding to county variance—the fact that a 
                                                          
Poritz also appears to have brought some skepticism about statistical analysis 
with her from the Attorney General’s office (“We have learned that statistical 
modeling for [sorting out the relationship between discretion and the race of 
defendants or victims] is largely untested and that its usefulness is uncertain.”) 
Id. 
310 State v. Harris, 757 A.2d 221 (N.J. 2000); State v. Feaster, 757 A.2d 
266 (N.J. 2000); State v. Morton, 757 A.2d 184 (N.J. 2000). 
311 757 A.2d 168 at 179. 
312 State v. Harris, 757 A.2d 221, 244 (N.J. 2000); State v. Feaster, 757 
A.2d 266, 284 (N.J. 2000); State v. Morton, 757 A.2d 184, 203 (N.J. 2000). 
313 D. Baime, Report to the Supreme Court Systemic Proportionality 
Review Project, at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/baime/baimereport.pdf (last 
visited July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Baime Report]. 
314 Id. at 4. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. at 4-5. 
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disproportionately large number of minority-victim cases are tried 
in counties with the lowest overall rates of cases progressing to the 
penalty phase of the trial.318 When county variance is accounted 
for, Baime concluded, “the evidence does not suggest that the race 
of the victim plays an important role in determining which death-
eligible cases advance to the penalty phase.”319 
F. Effects of the Proportionality Review Project 
Between 1987 and 2001, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
rendered a dozen proportionality review decisions in which it 
found every death sentence proportionate, both individually and 
systemically.320 During this period, the rate at which New Jersey 
juries imposed death sentences dropped significantly, to an average 
of about two per year.321 While many factors may be presumed to 
account for the drop, some criminal defense lawyers in New Jersey 
believe that the difficulty in making a death sentence “stick” has 
discouraged some prosecutors from seeking it.322 Not surprisingly, 
the Proportionality Review Project has inspired polarized 
                                                          
318 Id. at 5. 
319 Baime Report, supra note 313, at 5-6. 
320 Latzer, supra note 12, at 1199. There has been no systemic 
proportionality review of a death sentence in the New Jersey Supreme Court 
since 2001. However, in 2002, the court found the death sentence of Peter 
Papasavvas, a white man, disproportionate. State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 
800 (2002). The court’s decision was based on individual proportionality review 
(also known as procedural proportionality review), which concerns whether a 
sentence is unduly harsh compared with the sentences imposed in similar 
crimes, not systemic proportionality review, which concerns (among other 
things) whether statewide racial disparity in capital proceedings exists. Id.; see 
also text accompanying notes 187-89. 
321 See In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168, 176 (noting 
that in the five years before 2000, jurors had sentenced only ten defendants to 
death). 
322 E-mail message from Karl Keys, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 
Paterson, N.J., to Alex Lesman (Oct. 21, 2003) (on file with the Journal of Law 
and Policy). This view accords with that of scholars David Baldus and George 
Woodworth, who assert that “the most important feature of New Jersey’s 
proportionality review system is its feedback mechanism with the prosecutorial 
community, which, over time, appears to have developed a fairly conservative 
approach to capital charging.” Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 12, at 1461-62. 
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reactions, including the strongly negative reactions of some New 
Jersey governors, attorneys general, and legislators.323 Moreover, 
some scholars have lambasted the project324 while others have 
defended it.325 Regardless of how one views the undertaking, 
however, it seems fairly clear that the heyday of systemic 
proportionality review in New Jersey is over. With former 
Attorney General Deborah Poritz at the helm, the court has begun 
to scale back Baldus’s elaborate statistical models, which more 
often showed race effects than the models Baime substituted.326 In 
addition, Baime’s 2001 Special Master’s report, identifying county 
variance as the source of what little racial disparity he found, 
shifted the focus of systemic proportionality from the potential 
racial prejudice (conscious or unconscious) of prosecutors and 
juries to the more practical issue of how prosecutorial resources are 
used.327 
                                                          
323 See Bienen, supra note 12, at 207-208. 
324 See, e.g., Latzer, supra note 12, at 1162 (contending that “comparative 
proportionality review is constitutionally unwarranted, methodologically 
unsound, and theoretically incoherent, and, therefore, should be abolished”). 
325 See, e.g., Evan J. Mandery, In Defense of Specific Proportionality 
Review, 65 ALB. L.REV. 883, 925 (2002) (asserting that “New Jersey experience 
shows . . . that specific proportionality review is workable and useful”). 
326 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 223-26 and supra text accompanying 
notes 313-319. 
327 See Baime Report, supra note 313, at 5. The report revealed that the 
three urban counties with the highest number of death-eligible cases (Camden, 
Essex, and Union) had the lowest rate of advancement to death penalty trials (21 
percent). See Joseph R. McCarthy, Note, Implications of County Variance in 
New Jersey Capital Murder Cases: Arbitrary Decision-Making by County 
Prosecutors, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 969, 980 (2003). Although county 
variance may be driven in part by racial prejudice, the number of murders a 
county must deal with and the high cost of prosecuting a capital case are 
undeniably important factors in a district attorney’s decision-making. Whether 
county variance constitutes an arbitrary geographical disparity, and therefore 
violates equal protection, is open to argument, and could be the next front on 
which death penalty opponents attack the state’s capital punishment scheme. See 
id. at 983-84 (suggesting that significant geographic variance in rates at which 
prosecutors seek death could run afoul of the Constitution’s equal protection and 
cruel and unusual punishments provisions). In the summer of 2004 the New 
Jersey Attorney General’s office began reviewing and updating its 15-year-old 
Guidelines for the Designation for Capital Prosecutions, with the participation of 
county prosecutors, in an effort to promote greater uniformity in seeking the 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Neither the Kentucky Racial Justice Act nor the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s Proportionality Review Project could be deemed 
an unqualified success by its proponents. Indeed, there exists no 
body of case law illustrating that either state action has provided 
relief to any capital defendants.328 Nor is there a body of research 
to show that racial disparity in capital proceedings has been 
eliminated in either state.329 Yet there have been changes in the 
ways in which Kentucky and New Jersey administer their 
respective death penalty systems in recent years, and these changes 
are at least arguably attributable to these states’ responses to the 
specter of racial discrimination. 
A. Evaluating the Impact of the Kentucky and New Jersey 
Responses 
A few tentative findings emerge from examining the Kentucky 
Racial Justice Act and its repercussions. One is that the Act has 
provided defense lawyers a weapon to fend off capital trials for 
their clients in some cases; however a variety of factors—including 
tiny populations of racial minorities in many counties, 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ willingness to accept non-capital 
pleas, and defense lawyers’ reluctance to antagonize prosecutors—
have severely limited the use of this weapon. Another conclusion 
is that the Act has caused Kentucky prosecutors, at least in large 
counties with significant minority populations, to seek the death 
penalty in more black-victim cases, increasing the total of capital 
prosecutions statewide. A third conclusion is that the Kentucky 
Supreme Court, which has yet to consider a case raising a KRJA 
claim, has not been moved by the Act’s passage to treat 
                                                          
death penalty. Mary P. Gallagher, “White-Victim Effect” Impels AG to Review 
Death Penalty Guidelines, N.J. LAW JOURNAL, July 12, 2004, at 7. The Attorney 
General’s office undertook this review and update instead of implementing a 
central review system for all capital prosecution decisions, a step which Special 
Master Baime urged in his 2004 proportionality review report. Id. 
328 See supra note 123, text accompanying note 320. 
329 Recent official, statewide statistics are available for New Jersey, but not 
Kentucky. See note 344 and text accompanying note 317. 
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statistically-based claims of racial discrimination any more 
seriously than it did before 1998. Finally, despite these 
shortcomings, the KRJA at least serves as an official endorsement 
of racial equality in capital proceedings and a reminder that 
prosecutorial discrimination—even unconscious discrimination—
can be challenged under a state statute.330 
A Kentucky capital defendant faces an extremely difficult 
challenge in attempting to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that race was the basis of the decision to seek death in his 
particular case. A defendant’s first major obstacle is the fact that 
the KRJA outlaws only those death sentences sought “on the basis 
of race.”331 A finding that race was the basis of the decision can 
only occur if the court finds that “race was a significant factor” in 
the decision to seek death.332 These strictures seem impossible to 
justify on principle, since it is fundamental to equal protection 
doctrine that race is an arbitrary factor that should play no part in 
sentencing decisions.333 A constitutionally impermissible factor, if 
found to have been considered, should not have to be “significant” 
to allow the defendant relief; its mere presence should constitute an 
equal protection violation. 
Another hurdle is the KRJA’s requirement that the defendant 
“state with particularity how the evidence supports a claim that 
racial considerations played a significant part in the decision to 
seek a death sentence.”334 While the particularity requirement 
could signify nothing more than the need to logically connect the 
evidence to the claim, it easily lends itself to the prosecution 
argument that, for the claim to succeed, a particular 
                                                          
330 See note 340 and accompanying text. 
331 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(1) (Michie 2004) (emphasis added). 
Use of the words “the basis” indicates that race must at least be the predominant 
basis for seeking death, if not the sole basis, for the KRJA’s protections to 
apply. 
332 KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300(2) (Michie 2004) (emphasis added). 
333 The McCleskey Court itself acknowledged this point: “It would violate 
the Equal Protection Clause for a State to base enforcement of its criminal laws 
on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification’.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.8 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 
334 KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300(4) (Michie 2004) (emphasis added). 
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Commonwealth’s Attorney must be shown to have had specific 
intent to discriminate against the defendant himself.335 If this 
argument were to prevail, then the KRJA would represent 
absolutely no improvement over McCleskey.336 
Even under Batson v. Kentucky’s relatively defendant-friendly 
burden-shifting scheme for challenging racial discrimination in 
jury selection,337 defendants’ low success rate indicates just how 
difficult claims of prosecutorial discrimination are to win.338 One 
public defender’s comment in the KRJA survey—that “formally 
raising a Racial Justice Act motion would have dire consequences 
on the success of the defense attorney in that individual case and 
perhaps scores of other cases while the prosecutor cools down 
from being called a racist in the local paper”339—may help explain 
why both Batson and the KRJA are troublesome weapons for the 
defense. Interpersonal relationships among judges, prosecutors, 
and defense lawyers are important, especially in small-town 
courthouses. To raise a claim that brands a prosecutor as a racist 
could be strategically quite harmful at the trial level, even if the 
issue ought to be preserved for appeal.340 The foregoing 
                                                          
335 Specific intent is essentially what the McCleskey Court required: “[T]o 
prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the 
decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey, 481 
U.S. at 292. 
336 See discussion of McCleskey infra Part I.B. 
337 See discussion of Batson, supra note 67. 
338 See, e.g., United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1159-63 (3d Cir. 
1989) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (citing cases and articles demonstrating 
judges’ dereliction in enforcing the constitutional prohibition against racially 
based peremptory strikes). See also Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves 
Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. 
L.REV. 1807, 1830-31 (1993) (asserting that the level of review Batson imposes 
is not as rigorous as strict scrutiny, and that Batson’s race-neutral explanation 
requirement allows a prosecutor to hide his or her discrimination behind race-
neutral explanations). 
339 Neal, supra note 72, at 17-19. 
340 An accusation of racism has a unique sting. An ironic byproduct of the 
progress against overt racism in American society is that almost no one will 
admit to being racist to any degree, whether intentionally or unintentionally, 
because racism is now so roundly condemned. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 
321, 322-23 (arguing that the “illness of racism infects almost everyone” and 
explaining that “[w]hen an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas 
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considerations lead to the conclusion that absent a stark record of 
unexplained racial disparities in a given county, it is difficult to 
imagine a KRJA challenge leading a trial judge to bar the death 
penalty. 
It may be, as the anecdotal evidence from Kentucky public 
defenders suggests, that the primary use of the Act will be as 
leverage in pre-trial negotiations with Commonwealth’s Attorneys. 
Still, the amount of leverage the Act provides depends on the 
plausibility of a claim of significant racial disparity. A 
Commonwealth’s Attorney whose capital case demographics show 
racial balance is not likely to feel the pinch; neither is one who 
seeks death in every arguably aggravated murder. The KRJA 
certainly retains some symbolic value, although different parties 
disagree on how much value: a veteran prosecutor sees the Act as a 
sort of anti-death penalty fad,341 while its sponsor and some public 
defenders trumpet it as an important symbol of an ethos of equality 
in Kentucky.342 
In New Jersey, the supreme court has shown every sign of 
taking proportionality review, particularly systemic proportionality 
review for racial discrimination, quite seriously.343 But the court 
has yet to declare that the statistics presented to it actually prove 
racially disproportionate sentencing, even when supplied with 
statistical models that could have provided a defensible basis for 
such a conclusion.344 With the state’s capital sentencing rate 
slowing, the time for the court to invalidate a death sentence on the 
                                                          
and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism 
from consciousness”). 
341 Bouvier interview, supra note 166. 
342 Neal, supra note 72, at 15-16. 
343 See Bienen, supra note 12, at 147 (noting that “only the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has taken an unequivocal position that proportionality review 
and the systematic analysis of capital case processing is mandated by the state 
constitution.”); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 330 (N.J. 1987) (stating that the 
court “must ensure that discriminatory factors are not shifting the balance 
between life and death”); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1112 (N.J. 1992) 
(stating that “[w]hether in the exercise of statutory proportionality review or our 
constitutional duty to assure the equal protection and due process of law, we 
cannot escape the responsibility to review any effects of race in capital 
sentencing”). 
344 See discussion infra Part III.E. 
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grounds of systemic disproportionality may have come and 
gone.345 As the court remarked in 2000, “[i]t is ironic indeed that 
the result of juror reluctance to impose the death penalty is a 
database too small for reliable statistical analysis of race 
effects.”346 Looking beyond juror reluctance, however, the 
situation may not appear so ironic. Professors David Baldus and 
George Woodworth contend that “[a] compelling argument can be 
made that [the Proportionality Review Project] has enjoyed a 
reasonable measure of success in limiting death sentencing to 
highly aggravated cases.”347 Because highly aggravated cases show 
no appreciable racial discrimination in charging or sentencing,348 
the Proportionality Review Project could be said to have achieved 
the goal of eradicating discrimination in a roundabout way. 
Finally, like the Kentucky Racial Justice Act, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s proportionality review project carries symbolic 
weight. The court’s many references to New Jersey’s non-
discriminatory values, beginning with the repudiation of 
McCleskey in Marshall, bespeak an awareness of symbolism.349 
For some actors in the criminal justice system, proportionality 
review symbolizes obstructionism, but for others, it symbolizes a 
principled commitment to fairness.350 
It is interesting to note that both New Jersey’s and Kentucky’s 
actions appear to have affected prosecutors’ charging decisions—
although in opposite directions. In the wake of the KRJA’s 
passage, Kentucky prosecutors have increased their death notices 
in black-victim cases, perhaps in order to neutralize charges of 
race-of-victim discrimination.351 In New Jersey, meanwhile, 
                                                          
345 Baime’s proportionality reports are now annual, and subsequent reports 
have confirmed his 2001 conclusion that New Jersey’s death penalty system is 
not infected by racial prejudice, although defendants accused of killing whites 
are more likely to proceed to a capital trial that those who kill blacks. Action in 
Trenton, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 28, 2004, at 41. 
346 In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168, 176 (N.J. 
2000). 
347 Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 12, at 1463. 
348 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
349 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
350 See Bienen, supra note 12, at 207-9. 
351 See supra text accompanying notes 116, 161, 170. 
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prosecutors have retreated somewhat from seeking the death 
penalty, perhaps realizing that any death sentence they attain will 
be painstakingly and exhaustively reviewed by the state’s high 
court, whatever the defendant’s race.352 
B. Comparing the Legislative and Judicial Responses 
Comparison of the Kentucky legislation and the New Jersey 
jurisprudence presents obvious challenges, particularly the 
impossibility of holding constant the differences in history, 
demographics, and penal laws between the two states. Yet certain 
fruitful comparisons can be made. 
First, is instructive to note that Kentucky’s provision seeks to 
counteract, or even prevent, racial discrimination at the front end 
of the trial process, while New Jersey’s seeks to remedy racial 
discrimination, if found, after the trial process has run its course. 
The implication is clear: in the Kentucky scheme, the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney is implicated as the crucial actor in 
producing racial disparity, whereas in the New Jersey project both 
the jury and the district attorney are implicated as possible sources 
of such disparity. It is also significant that Kentucky’s response to 
the specter of racial discrimination came from the elected 
representatives of its citizens, while New Jersey’s came from 
appointed members of its judiciary.353 This difference raises the 
                                                          
352 See, e.g., Jim O’Neil, Death Row Inmate Gets Life in Waitress’s ‘93 
Slaying, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 11, 2004, at 35 (reporting that 
Middlesex County prosecutors would not seek death for John Chew, a white 
man whose original death sentence was vacated by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, and quoting the assistant prosecutor as saying, “[c]apital prosecutions 
require a huge investment in time, money and resources and it has become 
obvious to me that the New Jersey Supreme Court will not allow a death 
sentence to be imposed upon John Chew”). Adding a new hurdle for 
prosecutors, in February 2004 the New Jersey Supreme Court held in State v. 
Fortin, 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004), that prosecutors planning to seek the death 
penalty must first present evidence tending to prove a statutory aggravating 
factor to a grand jury as part of the indictment practice. 843 A.2d at 1027-28. 
353 Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the Governor and confirmed 
by the State Senate for initial terms of seven years. NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW Jersey, at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/ 
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issue of relative institutional competence: are legislatures or courts 
better able to address the problem of racial disparity in capital 
proceedings and the racial discrimination (conscious or 
unconscious) that presumably underlies it? 
At first blush the answer might seem to depend on whether we 
conceive of discrimination in capital punishment as a political 
issue or a legal one. But disentangling political issues, appropriate 
for the legislative and executive branches, from legal issues, 
appropriate for the judicial branch, is not easy. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville famously observed more than 150 years ago, 
“[s]carcely any political question arises in the United States that is 
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”354 Still, one 
clarification is helpful: the central issue presented by disparities in 
the death penalty is not crime control, for neither the desirability 
nor the constitutionality of the death penalty per se are necessarily 
at stake. Rather, the central issue is the protection of rights, namely 
the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments and the right 
to the equal protection of the laws. Thus the question becomes, is a 
particular branch of government best suited to protect these rights? 
A useful way of approaching this question is presented by 
political scholar John J. Dinan.355 He identifies three regimes of 
rights protection in U.S. history, each arising from the socio-
political and economic developments of its time, and each 
achieving some degree of success under certain circumstances.356 
Dinan calls the first regime republicanism, which arose in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and which understood 
representative assemblies to be the most capable of securing 
rights.357 He asserts that on the whole these assemblies achieved a 
commendable level of rights protection but fell short when the 
rights at issue conflicted with representatives’ self-interest or when 
representatives got caught up in the “momentary passions” of the 
                                                          
(last visited Jan. 17, 2005). On reappointment, they are granted tenure until they 
reach the mandatory retirement judicial retirement age of 70. Id. 
354 Quoted in LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME 
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 1 (2002). 
355 JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, 
CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS (1998). 
356 Id. at 167. 
357 Id. at 168. 
LESMAN MACROED 2-16-05.DOC 3/7/2005 7:27 PM 
416 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
day.358 The second regime was populism, which emerged at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and which maintained that 
rights were best protected through direct democratic institutions, 
such as state constitutional conventions.359 The third was 
judicialism, which arose in the middle of the twentieth century, and 
which presumed that judges were best qualified to protect the 
people’s rights.360 
Dinan contends that judicialist institutions have performed 
better than representative institutions in securing rights during 
periods of social and political ferment, when they have been better 
insulated from transitory passions.361 He also points out that none 
of these regimes have been totally dominant; non-dominant 
institutions have continued to act on rights issues throughout each 
regime, with varying degrees of assertiveness.362 
The present period is one of judicialist regime dominance.363 In 
the past few decades the United States has experienced a 
renaissance of state supreme courts’ power and influence.364 Given 
these conditions, it is not surprising that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court arrogated to itself the responsibility for rights protection in 
capital proceedings. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Gregg, 
gave its imprimatur to state supreme court proportionality review 
(although it later decided such review is not constitutionally 
required).365 To apply Dinan’s conception, capital crimes 
presumably arouse such popular passions that representative 
assemblies cannot be trusted to protect defendants’ rights as 
effectively as judicial institutions. This presumption appears to 
underlie the Furman decision, the U.S. Supreme Court’s entry into 
                                                          
358 Id. at 169. 
359 Id. at 168. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at 169. 
362 Id. at 167-71. 
363 Id. at 168. 
364 See LANGER, supra note 354, at 2. See also William J. Brennan, The Bill 
of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.REV. 535, 548-50 (1986). 
365 See discussion of Gregg supra Part I.A. and Pulley supra Part III.A. 
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death penalty regulation.366 
New Jersey’s experience with proportionality review highlights 
another factor affecting judicial action, not just in rights protection, 
but in every area of the law: social consensus. Courts function 
within a system of checks and balances, and, as institutions, they 
have always been responsive to majoritarian interests.367 One way 
of understanding the Proportionality Review Project—which the 
New Jersey Supreme Court created on its own initiative, poured 
significant resources into, struggled with, and eventually 
downsized without finding a single death sentence 
disproportionate—is as a manifestation of the conflict between the 
court’s belief in judicialism and its sensitivity to popular 
concerns.368 
The Kentucky Racial Justice Act, on the other hand, represents 
a rare effort by an institution of a non-dominant regime to protect 
the rights of a marginal, even despised, group—defendants accused 
of aggravated murder. The Act’s backers were able to achieve 
what had not been achieved in the U.S. Congress or in any other 
state. The KRJA’s passage is all the more extraordinary in light of 
Kentucky’s history of racial discrimination and racial violence, and 
the continuing popular approval of the death penalty there and 
across the country.369 Yet the KRJA’s very terms, as we have seen, 
                                                          
366 The Furman Court effectively invalidated the work of forty state 
legislatures and commuted the sentences of 629 men on death row when it ruled 
that no death sentences could be carried out under existing capital punishment 
statutes. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, HISTORY OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY, PART I, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php 
?scid=15&did=410#ConstitutionalityoftheDeathPenaltyinAmerica (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2005). 
367 See DONALD E. LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE 
GOVERNED: ACTIVIST WAYS AND POPULAR ENDS 125 (1990). 
368 See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 12, at 1461 (observing that 
“[a]lthough the New Jersey court is highly respected, it has been criticized for its 
high standards in the review of death cases” and “[i]n response, the court 
adopted conservative substantive standards to guide its reviews”). 
369 In a 1999 University of Louisville poll, 59.2 percent of Kentucky 
respondents supported the death penalty. In a 2002 University of Kentucky poll, 
32 percent of Kentuckians opposed legislation to raise the age of death-
eligibility from 16 to 18. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SUMMARIES 
OF RECENT POLL FINDINGS, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?scid=23&did=210#Kentucky (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
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resign it to extremely limited practical effect.370 The Act was 
crafted to address the problem laid bare in McCleskey by providing 
Kentucky’s capital defendants with a weapon for challenging the 
decision to seek death penalty in their cases. But in order to get the 
Act through the legislature, its backers, probably mindful of the 
federal Racial Justice Act’s demise, created a weapon that is 
difficult to wield.371 
In the course of the legislative process, KRJA supporters also 
antagonized prosecutors, some of the executive branch’s most 
visible and powerful members, by implying that prosecutorial 
discretion is sometimes tainted by racism.372 As noted above, the 
desire of prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges alike to get 
along and “save face” plays a major role in what defense claims 
are raised and how they are adjudicated.373 In light of this 
interpersonal dynamic—and considering that Kentucky is 
composed mostly of rural counties with very little racial 
diversity—it is not surprising that use of the KRJA has been 
sparing.374 Thus the KRJA, although a symbolic victory for rights 
protection, has been of limited use both to defendants and to those 
who would look to Kentucky as a laboratory for legislatively-
enacted tools for ensuring racial equality in capital proceedings. 
C. A Proposal for Adjudicating Claims of Racial 
Discrimination in Capital Proceedings 
In the eighteen years since McCleskey was handed down, 
                                                          
370 See supra text accompanying notes 331-36. 
371 In fact, Sen. Gerald Neal’s intention in sponsoring the KRJA may have 
been simply to hold prosecutors to a higher standard, not give defense lawyers a 
usable litigation weapon, as his comments shortly after the Act’s passage 
suggest: “I would be amazed if anyone successfully avoids the death penalty 
under this legislation [. . .] prosecutors are going to be so careful as they decide 
whether to seek death, that they’ll build such a tight case for it, that no judge 
will rule against them.” John Cheves, If Death Penalty Has Taint of Race, Can 
Law Remove It?, THE LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 15, 1998, at A1. 
372 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
373 See id. 
374 See Patton interview, supra note 166 (noting that most Kentucky 
counties have almost entirely White residents); KENTUCKY QUICKFACTS, supra 
note 71. 
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scholars have produced a sea of articles and books about the 
decision, the vast majority finding significant fault with the Court’s 
opinion.375 Among the many scholarly proposals for dealing with 
the challenge the McCleskey Court avoided—that of crafting a 
framework for deciding whether claims that racial disparities in 
capital proceedings represent constitutional violations in individual 
cases—perhaps the most straightforward and powerful proposal is 
simply to treat these claims like equal protection claims in other 
areas of the law.376 
Under established Supreme Court equal protection doctrine, a 
party claiming discrimination must show racially discriminatory 
intent or purpose behind the decision at issue to make out a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause377 But that party need not 
prove discriminatory intent by direct evidence.378 Rather, as the 
Court stated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Division Corporation, “invidious discriminatory purpose may 
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.”379 Judicial 
                                                          
375 See, e.g., Bynam, supra note 22; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious 
Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); SAMUEL R. 
GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES 
IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 159-211 (1989); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. 
Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in 
Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 509, 510 (1994); Bright, supra note 
19, at 480. Even Justice Powell, the author of the McCleskey opinion, came to 
wish that he could change his vote in the case. David Von Drehle, Retired 
Justice Changes Stand on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at A1. 
376 See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 18, at 1778-80 (noting that 
“McCleskey purports to be rooted in and consistent with standard equal 
protection analysis” and asserting that “no reason exists to believe that 
prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty are exempt from the dictates of 
the Equal Protection Clause”). 
377 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
378 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). In Arlington Heights, a real estate developer that had 
purchased land to build racially-integrated low-income housing sued after local 
authorities refused to rezone the land from single-family to multi-family. Id. at 
254. The developer claimed that the village’s action was racially discriminatory 
and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
379 Id. at 266; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (stating that 
“an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of 
the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily 
upon one race than another”). 
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analysis therefore “demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available.”380 
Thus if courts take equal protection doctrine seriously in the 
criminal context, they should apply an equivalent burden-shifting 
scheme to claims of racial discrimination in capital proceedings.381 
For example, if a capital defendant can show by rigorous statistical 
analysis that the district attorney who prosecuted him has a racially 
disparate record of seeking death, the court should recognize that 
the defendant has fulfilled the first two Arlington Heights factors, 
showing “the impact of the official action” and “[t]he historical 
background of the decision.”382 If the defendant can show that the 
district attorney assigned more staff members to, devoted more 
funds to, or otherwise prioritized the prosecution of a white-victim 
or black-defendant case, the court should recognize that the 
defendant has shown “[d]epartures from the normal procedural 
                                                          
380 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. The Arlington Heights Court listed 
several factors to consider in testing for discriminatory intent: “the impact of the 
official action,” “[t]he historical background of the decision . . . particularly if it 
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes,” “[d]epartures 
from the normal procedural sequence,” “substantive departures . . . particularly 
if the factors usually considered important by the decision maker strongly favor 
a decision contrary to the one reached,” and “contemporary statements by 
members of the decision-making body.” Id. at 267-68. The Court made clear 
that this list is not exhaustive. Id. at 268. If factors such as these are convincing, 
a court may find that the party claiming discrimination has made out a prima 
facie case of discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; 
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972). The burden then shifts to the 
other party to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that 
race-neutral criteria or procedures produced the racially disparate effect. 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241. Burden-shifting schemes make a great 
deal of sense in the context of racial discrimination claims, since discriminatory 
actors can always be expected to deny invidious intent (whether or not they are 
even conscious of having such intent). See Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black 
Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 154 (1998) (citing 
Charles Lawrence’s thesis that decision-making influenced by racial factors 
often occurs unconsciously and arguing that “the government actor’s conscious 
mental state should be irrelevant to the constitutional analysis”). 
381 See Blume et al., supra note 18, at 1778-80. 
382 See Arlington Heights, supra notes 378, 380. 
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sequence.”383 Finally, if the defendant can show that the district 
attorney decided to seek death in white-victim or black-defendant 
cases while eschewing capital charges in black-victim or white-
defendant cases with essentially the same aggravating and 
mitigating factors, the court should recognize that the defendant 
has shown “substantive departures.”384 
These factors, taken together, should establish a prima facie 
case, which the prosecution should be required to rebut with 
evidence that conclusively demonstrates race-neutral factors and 
explanations for the racially disparate effects the defendant 
showed. Failure to rebut the prima facie case should result in a 
finding of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.385 
This proposal focuses on the district attorney (or the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, as the case may be) for two important 
reasons. First, unlike jurors, district attorneys are repeat actors in 
the system, so their decisions can be tracked over time. Second, a 
showing of what the particular district attorney in a defendant’s 
county has done over time has substantially more probative force 
than a statewide showing, as in McCleskey.386 Finally, it should be 
noted that this proposal would not restrict relief to those defendants 
who could show racial discrimination in their own cases. If, in a 
given case, a court finds that race has operated as a factor in capital 
proceedings in that county, then the system that the defendant 
faces operates unconstitutionally, and the defendant should not 
                                                          
383 See id. 
384 See id. 
385 This proposal essentially tracks the burden-shifting scheme the Court 
has applied in the contexts mentioned infra Part I.C: grand jury venires, 
peremptory strikes of jurors, voting rights, and employment. See supra note 67. 
Even in the McCleskey opinion, the Court cited with approval Bazemore v. 
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) for the proposition that it “has accepted statistics in 
the form of multiple-regression analysis to prove statutory violations under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. at 400-1. Justice Blackmun, in his 
McCleskey dissent, advocated a similar burden-shifting scheme. 481 U.S. at 
351-61. In its broad outlines, the proposal sketched out above also differs little 
from the Kentucky Racial Justice Act. But the KRJA, while establishing a 
burden-shifting scheme and allowing statistical proof, is hamstrung by highly 
restrictive language, as discussed infra Part IV.A. 
386 See Blume et al., supra note 18, at 1794. 
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have to prove that the decisions in his own case were 
discriminatory.387 
CONCLUSION 
The Kentucky Racial Justice Act and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s Proportionality Review Project came about essentially as 
experiments in addressing conditions some perceived to be unjust. 
In neither state was there broad agreement that racial disparity in 
capital proceedings was a significant problem that required 
remediation. Yet in each state, key government decision makers, 
unlike their counterparts in the vast majority of death penalty 
states, responded to racial disparity with official action. These 
official responses were shaped by the unique legal-political 
cultures of the two states, but both were motivated to some degree 
by the desire to conform state practice to the ideal inscribed on 
many American courthouses: Equal Justice Under Law. These 
official responses have also been curtailed by the same legal-
political cultures, in which a significant portion of voters and 
politicians support the death penalty for the perpetrators of the 
most heinous crimes.388 
                                                          
387 The foregoing proposal does not necessarily preclude state supreme 
court proportionality review. Indeed, state supreme courts could still undertake 
rigorous systemic proportionality reviews, in the spirit of New Jersey’s 
proportionality review project. Courts could vacate any death sentence that 
contributes to a clear, disproportionate statewide pattern unexplained by 
nonracial factors, as the federal Racial Justice Act would have provided. Racial 
Justice Act, H.R. 4017, 103d Cong. § 2921(d)-(e) (1994). This review could 
serve as a second safeguard, monitoring the capital punishment system with a 
statewide perspective difficult to attain at the county level. The difficulties of 
such review, however, have been made manifest by the New Jersey experience. 
Conducting a truly rigorous review is expensive; it slows down the appellate 
process significantly; it annoys and alienates death penalty supporters in the 
executive and legislative branches; and it does not guarantee that any clear 
conclusions will emerge, which risks undermining public confidence in the 
court’s decision to undertake the project in the first place. If a burden-shifting 
scheme were put in place and conscientiously applied, both to pre-trial motions 
and claims on appeal, statewide systemic proportionality review should not be 
necessary. 
388 See supra note 369. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
SUMMARIES OF RECENT POLL FINDINGS, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
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The death penalty functions as a powerful symbol in American 
public life.389 It simplifies complex social issues, unites many 
people in the belief that something is being done about an 
important problem, and reassures anxious communities.390 More 
disturbingly, among white Americans, support for the death 
penalty strongly correlates with anti-black prejudice.391 Of course 
this does not mean that all whites who support the death penalty 
consciously do so because of racial animus. But the nation’s 
painful experience with slavery, state sanctioned racial bias, 
racially motivated violence, and extrajudicial executions makes the 
link between anti-black prejudice and death penalty support—at 
least on an unconscious level—difficult to dismiss. Given this 
context, any state institutional response to the specter of racial 
discrimination in capital proceedings, whether legislative, judicial, 
executive, or a combination of the three, must be made with the 
understanding that it is only one limited step down a long and 
arduous road. A decent respect for reality requires us to 
                                                          
article.php?scid=23&did=210#NewJersey (last visited January 28, 2005) 
(showing death penalty support in New Jersey at 63 percent in 1999). 
389 David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the 
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1582 (1996). 
390 Id. 
391 See Barkan & Cohn, supra note 16, at 205-6 (finding that White support 
for the death penalty was associated with antipathy to Blacks and with racial 
stereotyping), Soss et al. supra note 16, at 414 (finding that racial prejudice had 
the largest influence of any factor in the analysis). The 1994 study by Barkan & 
Cohn was based on data in the 1990 General Social Survey, a random sample of 
the U.S. adult population conducted almost annually since 1972. Barkan & 
Cohn, supra note 16, at 203. Barkan & Cohn’s anti-black prejudice variable was 
constructed by selecting several survey questions the researchers thought 
indicative of prejudice, such as the degree to which respondents favored or 
opposed “living in a neighborhood where half your neighbors were Blacks” and 
“having a close relative or family member marry a Black person.” Id. The 2003 
study by Soss et al. was based on data from the 1992 American National 
Election Study. In addition, there are many measures of racially differential 
beliefs about the death penalty; for example, in a recent poll, 58 percent of 
African-Americans, but only 35 percent of white Americans, agreed that the 
death penalty “is applied . . . unfairly in this country today.” UNITED STATES 
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2004, Table 
2.52, Attitudes Toward Fairness of the Application of the Death Penalty, 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t252.pdf. 
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acknowledge that significant progress against racial disparity in the 
imposition of the death penalty will be achieved only after a candid 
public assessment of the death penalty as public policy, as well as 
a concerted effort against the “illness of racism”392 in American 
society as a whole. 
 
                                                          
392 Lawrence, supra note 14, at 321. 
